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 Epidemiological evidence is regularly pre-
sented to courts in determining proof of causation 
in medicinal product liability litigation. Building 
on the foundations of the author’s previous mono-
graph, which supported the use of epidemiological 
evidence in dealing with problems of proof of cau-
sation in alleged cases of adverse drug reactions, 
this paper revisits this perennial problem of the 
role of epidemiological evidence in assessing cau-
sation in product liability cases in a twenty-first 
century context, examining recent cases in the 
United Kingdom, United States, Australia, and 
Canada. It seeks to determine the extent to which 
the courts in the highlighted cases have been 
pragmatic and fair in their interpretation and uti-
lization of epidemiological evidence, from the per-
spective of both consumers and pharmaceutical 
manufacturers. The paper examines the apparent 
tension between the levels of proof required in law 
and science, including the relationship between 
levels of statistical significance and the claimant’s 
burden of proof; and it assesses the wisdom of us-
ing a doubling of the risk rule as a threshold to 
any recovery. It explores the ways in which proba-
bilistic methods, including statistical refining with 
individual risk factors, can be used in conjunction 
with epidemiological evidence to determine specif-
ic causation. The paper supports the view that lo-
gistic regression techniques and other forms of 
statistical refining mechanisms using specific risk 
factors can and do help in the process of giving 
quantitative or quasi-quantitative expression to 
conclusions about the cause of disease in an indi-
vidual drug product liability claim that is based on 
epidemiological evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
La preuve épidémiologique est régulière-
ment présentée pour démontrer la causalité 
dans les litiges en matière de responsabilité 
pour les produits thérapeutiques.  
En se fondant sur l’une des monographies 
précédentes de l’auteur, qui appuie le recours à 
la preuve épidémiologique pour traiter des dif-
ficultés à prouver la causalité dans des affaires 
portant sur les effets indésirables de médica-
ments, cet article réexamine, dans le contexte 
du XXIe siècle, le problème constant du rôle de 
la preuve épidémiologique dans les questions de 
causalité en matière de responsabilité du fabri-
cant. Il analyse à cette fin la jurisprudence du 
Royaume-Uni, des États-Unis, de l’Australie et 
du Canada. Cet article cherche à cerner jusqu’à 
quel point les tribunaux ont adopté, dans les af-
faires étudiées, une approche pragmatique et 
juste en interprétant et en utilisant la preuve 
épidémiologique, tant du point de vue des con-
sommateurs que de celui des fabricants de pro-
duits pharmaceutiques. Il examine la tension 
entre les niveaux de preuve nécessaire dans les 
domaines scientifique et juridique, y compris la 
relation entre les niveaux de signification sta-
tistique et le fardeau de la preuve du deman-
deur, et évalue la possibilité d’utiliser la règle 
de doublement du risque comme seuil pour un 
recouvrement judiciaire. Il explore les façons 
dont les méthodes probabilistes, telles que 
l’affinage des statistiques avec des facteurs de 
risque, peuvent être utilisées en conjonction 
avec la preuve épidémiologique afin de déter-
miner la causalité spécifique. Cet article avance 
que les techniques de régression logistique, ain-
si que d’autres mécanismes de raffinement sta-
tistique se servant de facteurs de risque spéci-
fiques, peuvent aider à donner une expression 
quantitative ou quasi-quantitative aux conclu-
sions portant sur la causalité dans une récla-
mation en responsabilité pour un produit thé-
rapeutique basé sur la preuve épidémiologique. 
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Introduction 
 Proof of causation in toxic tort litigation is an inherently difficult prob-
lem, which regularly requires time-consuming analysis of complex scien-
tific evidence.1 The difficulties in proving both general causation (whether 
a product was capable of causing the damage alleged) and specific causa-
tion (whether the product did so in the individual case) are magnified in 
the context of medicinal products.2 As Harvey Teff and Colin Munro have 
highlighted: 
Drugs are always potentially dangerous due to their toxicity. They 
are often taken by people who are already ill and who may be unu-
sually susceptible to further ailments. Unlike many other products, 
they may cause injury in unpredictable ways, depending on the in-
dividual user’s constitution. They may not be taken according to the 
instructions. The user may be allergic to a particular drug. Alterna-
tively, what appears to be an allergy may in fact be a toxic reaction.3  
 With a multitude of new kinds of drugs emerging as a harvest of the 
scientific and technological revolutions of both the twentieth and early 
twenty-first centuries, the cases have become even more complex, de-
manding much from lawyers and scientific experts on both sides and from 
judges themselves.4 
                                                   
1   See CJ Miller & RS Goldberg, Product Liability, 2d ed (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2004) at para 17.05.  
2   Richard Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of Torts: Scientific Evidence and 
Medicinal Product Liability (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 1999) 5 et seq [Goldberg, Causa-
tion and Risk in the Law of Torts]. 
3   Harvey Teff and Colin Munro, Thalidomide: The Legal Aftermath (Farnborough: Saxon 
House, 1976) at 135–36. “Clearly it is often harder to prove that one’s injuries are due 
to an adverse drug reaction than that they have been caused by a faulty machine” 
(Harvey Teff, “Regulation Under the Medicines Act 1968: A Continuing Prescription for 
Health” (1984) 47:3 Mod L Rev 303 at 322). Professor Teff also notes “[t]he synergistic 
effects of certain combinations (for example, barbiturates and alcohol, anti-histamines 
and cheese) may prove fatal” (Harvey Teff, “Products Liability in the Pharmaceutical 
Industry at Common Law” (1974) 20:1 McGill LJ 102 at 115).  
4   See e.g. Bonthrone v Secretary of State for Scotland, 1987 SLT 34, Jauncey LJ, cited in 
Diana Brahams, “Pertussis Vaccine and Brain Damage: Two Claims Before the Courts” 
(1985) 326 Lancet 1137 (on the existence of cryptogenic (unknown) causes to eliminate 
any possible causal connection between the pertussis vaccine and brain damage); see 
also Loveday v Renton (1988), [1990] 1 Med LR 117 (QB) at 185 [Loveday], Stuart-
Smith LJ, discussed in Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of Torts, supra note 2 
at 137–43 (after examining complex scientific evidence and arguments, Lord Stuart-
Smith held that the plaintiff had failed to prove on a balance of probabilities that the 
pertussis (whooping cough) vaccine could cause permanent brain damage in young 
children); Kay v Ayrshire and Arran Health Board , [1987] 2 All ER 417, 1987 SC 145 
(HL Eng) (penicillin overdose was held to be not capable of causing or aggravating 
deafness). Consider also the US mass tort litigation concerning Bendectin (Debendox), 
the anti-nausea drug used in pregnancy. In contrast to thalidomide, where many lines 
of evidence have shown that the drug caused phocomelia malformations (see Henning 
6    (2014) 59:4  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
 The practical significance of establishing causation in a medicinal 
product liability case cannot be overstated. In the United Kingdom, 
whether the claim is in negligence or under the strict liability provisions 
of the Product Liability Directive,5 proof of causation will often lead to ei-
      
Sjöström & Robert Nilsson, Thalidomide and the Power of the Drug Companies (Har-
mondsworth: Penguin, 1972) at 156–59), no causal link has ever been scientifically es-
tablished between Bendectin and birth defects. The Bendectin litigation demonstrated 
a persistent failure by plaintiffs’ lawyers to prove causation. Joseph Sanders wrote the 
seminal paper on this topic: “The Bendectin Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle 
of Mass Torts” (1992) 43:2 Hastings LJ 301. For a discussion of the litigation’s implica-
tions in the United Kingdom, see Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of Tort, su-
pra note 2 at 102–31. The litigation spawned two formative monographs: Michael D 
Green, Bendectin and Birth Defects: The Challenges of Mass Toxic Substances Litiga-
tion (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1996); Joseph Sanders, Bendectin 
on Trial: A Study of Mass Tort Litigation (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1998). Thirty years after Bendectin’s withdrawal from the market, the drug (now re-
named Diclegis) has won Food and Drug Administration approval as the only FDA-
approved treatment for morning sickness (FDA News Release, “FDA approves Diclegis 
for pregnant women experiencing nausea and vomiting”, online: US Food and Drug 
Administration 
<www.fda.gov/NewsEvents/Newsroom/PressAnnouncements/ucm347087.htm, accessed 
13 April 2013>; Associated Press, “Morning Sickness Drug Returns”, The New York 
Times (8 April 2013), online: The New York Times 
<www.nytimes.com/2013/04/09/us/morning-sickness-drug-
returns.html?emc=tnt&tntemail1=y&_r=0&pagewanted=print>). 
5   EC, Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 July 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, 
Regulations and Administrative Provisions of the Member States Concerning Liability 
for Defective Products, [1985] OJ, L 210/29. By article 4 of the Directive, and section 
2(1) of the Consumer Protection Act 1987 (UK), c 43, s 2(1), the person injured by a de-
fective medicinal product must prove the damage, the defect, and the causal relation-
ship between them. The damage must have been caused “wholly or partly by a defect” 
in the medicinal product. Thus the formal distinction between negligence and strict li-
ability is that with negligence, it must be proven that breach of a duty caused the 
harm, whereas under the 1987 Act, it must be proven that a defect caused the damage 
(see Pamela R Ferguson, Drug Injuries and the Pursuit of Compensation (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1996) at 125). It appears that each member state will rely on its own 
theory of causation as established in its civil liability system, though it has been ob-
served that some kind of semi-autonomous European understanding of causation could 
be established from common elements of the member states’ legal systems (see Simon 
Whittaker, “The EEC Directive on Product Liability” (1985) 5 YB Eur L 233 at 247). 
The argument that causation is likely to be defined and interpreted by national law 
and assessed by national courts is strengthened by the decision of the European Court 
of Justice in Henning Veedfald v. Århus Amtskommune, where the Court concluded 
that it was for the national court to decide whether a claim was to be categorized in re-
spect of personal injury, property damage, or non-material damage (C-203/99 [2001] 
ECR I-3587 at I-3599–3600). This is subject to a qualification founded on the principle 
of effectiveness, in that national laws must not by their interpretation of causation 
render ineffective either the protection of injured persons or the restraints on liability 
of producers, since both reflect the “fair apportionment of risk” of the Directive. In so 
doing, however, courts will take into consideration the extent to which these causal is-
sues combine issues of fact and their evaluation and questions of law (see Simon Whit-
taker, Liability for Products: English Law, French Law, and European Harmonisation 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) at 512–13). The European Commission be-
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ther a settlement or a successful claim.6 Conversely, a failure to establish 
a causal link between a medicinal product and, for example, the alleged 
medical conditions of claimants, may lead to such claims being struck out 
as an abuse of the process of the court on the basis that each claim has no 
real prospect of success.7  
 Epidemiology is defined as “the field of public health and medicine 
that studies the incidence, distribution and etiology of disease in human 
populations.”8 Epidemiological evidence is regularly presented to courts in 
determining proof of causation in medicinal product liability litigation. 
Building on the foundations of the author’s previous monograph, which 
supported the use of epidemiological evidence in dealing with problems of 
proof of causation in alleged cases of adverse drug reactions,9 this paper 
revisits the perennial problem of the role of epidemiological evidence in 
assessing causation in product liability cases in a twenty-first century 
context, examining recent cases in the United Kingdom, United States, 
Australia, and Canada. In essence, it seeks to determine the extent to 
which the courts in the highlighted cases have been pragmatic and fair in 
their interpretation and utilization of epidemiological evidence, from the 
perspective of both consumers and pharmaceutical manufacturers.  
 In order to establish factual causation in the context of medicinal 
product liability, claimants must prove both general causation (“whether 
a substance is capable of causing a particular injury or condition in the 
general population”)10 and specific causation (“whether a substance 
caused a particular individual’s injury”).11 Since epidemiology is based on 
      
lieves that “injured parties can establish the causal link in cases where a defective 
product causes damage irrespective of the differences between national procedural 
rules” (EC, Fourth Report on the Application of Council Directive 85/374/EEC of 25 Ju-
ly 1985 on the Approximation of the Laws, Regulations and Administrative Provisions 
of the Member States Concerning Liability for Defective Products (Brussels: EC, 2011) 
at 11), though it has noted the views of consumers that there is difficulty in “proving 
the causal link between the defect and damage when such damage is complex in na-
ture” (ibid at 7). Consumers believe that the burden of proof should be reversed (ibid).  
6   Mark Mildred, “Representing the Plaintiff” in Geraint G Howells, ed, Product Liability, 
Insurance and the Pharmaceutical Industry: An Anglo-American Comparison (Man-
chester: Manchester University Press, 1991) 24 at 27.  
7   See Miller & Goldberg, supra note 1 at para 17.02.  
8   Michael D Green, D Michal Freedman & Leon Gordis, “Reference Guide on Epidemiol-
ogy” in Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence, 3d ed ( Washington: National Acade-
mies Press, 2011) 549 at 551 [Green, “Epidemiology”]. 
9   See generally Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of Torts, supra note 2. 
10   Merck & Co v Garza, 347 SW (3d) 256 at 262 (Tex 2011) [Garza], citing Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals v Havner, 953 SW (2d) 706 at 714 (Tex 1997) [Havner]. 
11   See ibid; Garza, supra note 10. See also Michael D Green, “The Future of Proportional 
Liability: The Lessons of Toxic Substances Causation” in M Stuart Madden, ed, Explor-
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the study of populations and not individuals, it focuses on the question of 
general causation rather than specific causation.12 Epidemiological evi-
dence may identify an association between a drug and a disease, but 
whether such an association is causal requires an evaluation of the evi-
dence, with emphasis on the extent to which weaknesses of a study’s de-
sign and implementation compromise its findings and inferences about 
causation.13 
 The results of epidemiological studies cannot per se conclusively prove 
specific causation. However, several cases have focused on the role that 
epidemiological evidence plays in determining proof of specific causation, 
which is a legal question addressed by courts.14 This paper explores the 
ways in which probabilistic methods, including statistical refining with 
individual risk factors, can be used in conjunction with epidemiological 
evidence to determine specific causation.  
 Part IA explores the apparent tension between the levels of proof re-
quired in law and science, including the relationship between levels of 
statistical significance and the claimant’s burden of proof. Part IB assess-
es the wisdom of using a “doubling of the risk” rule as a threshold to any 
recovery. Notwithstanding the problems with the doubling of risk theory 
in the United States, its usage appears to be gaining ground in the United 
Kingdom. Moreover, in particular, the doubling of risk theory has come to 
recent attention in the context of the utilization and value of epidemiolog-
ical or statistical evidence alone in determining causation on a balance of 
probabilities, with discussion by the UK Supreme Court in Sienkiewicz v. 
Greif.15 A cautious attitude toward the use of the doubling of risk rule in 
the context of both general and specific causation is seen from the case 
law explored. In examining the distinction between association and cau-
sation, Part IC discerns two main reasons for this judicial scepticism 
about epidemiological evidence, namely the propriety of drawing causal 
inferences from observed associations (a general causation issue) and the 
propriety of drawing causal inferences in individual cases from conceded-
ly causal associations observed in samples of populations (a specific cau-
sation issue). These reasons are discussed in an analysis of the controver-
sial Scottish case of McTear v. Imperial Tobacco Ltd16 and the decision of 
      
ing Tort Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005) 352 at 366 [Green, “Pro-
portional Liability”]. 
12   See Green, “Epidemiology”, supra note 8 at 552; Steve Gold, “Causation in Toxic Torts: 
Burdens of Proof, Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence” (1986) 96 Yale LJ 
376 at 379–80. 
13   Green, “Epidemiology”, supra note 8 at 552–53, 598.  
14   Ibid at 609.  
15   Sienkiewicz v Greif, [2011] UKSC 10, [2011] 2 WLR 523 [Sienkiewicz].  
16   McTear v Imperial Tobacco Ltd, [2005] CSOH 69, 2 SC 1 (Ct Sess Scot) [McTear]. 
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the Federal Full Court of Australia in Merck Sharp & Dohme (Australia) 
Pty Ltd v. Peterson.17 In the context of McTear, Part ID discusses the ne-
cessity of requiring something more than a doubling of the risk to permit 
the claimant to recover, and it stresses the role of judges in resolving this 
issue. 
 Part IE discusses the implications for specific causation, in the context 
of McTear, of epidemiology being based on the study of populations and 
not individuals. It suggests that the limitations of epidemiological evi-
dence in determining specific causation as described by the trial judge are 
somewhat inaccurate since, in establishing specific causation, epidemiolo-
gists can and do adjust for potentially confounding factors through logistic 
regression techniques and other forms of statistical refining mechanisms. 
Part IF therefore concludes with an examination of such statistical refin-
ing methods in determining specific causation in medicinal product liabil-
ity cases, including the use of Bayes’ theorem to help us understand how 
statistical risks can be refined using personal risk factors. The paper does 
not argue that Bayes’ theorem is necessarily the answer to the problem of 
establishing specific causation in the context of epidemiological evidence. 
Nonetheless, while recognizing the limitations of Bayes’ theorem, the pa-
per supports the view that logistic regression techniques and other forms 
of statistical refining mechanisms using specific risk factors can and do 
help in the process of giving quantitative or quasi-quantitative expression 
to conclusions about the cause of disease in an individual drug product li-
ability claim that is based on epidemiological evidence. Finally, the paper 
illustrates the increasing support for the refining and personalizing of ep-
idemiological evidence in cases of individual causation involving medici-
nal products, as evidenced by the decision of the Ontario Superior Court 
of Justice in Andersen v. St Jude.18 
I. Reconciling the Standards of Proof in Law and Science in the United 
Kingdom 
A. Evidence of Causation for Purposes of Science and for Purposes of Law 
 There is an apparent tension between the levels of proof required in 
law and in science. For the law of negligence, it is sufficient to show that 
the balance of probabilities—meaning more than fifty per cent, or on a 
preponderance of the evidence—indicates a causal connection. It is some-
times erroneously assumed by lawyers that scientists regard an associa-
                                                   
17   Merck Sharp & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson, [2011] FCAFC 128, 284 ALR 1, 
leave to appeal to HCA refused, [2012] HCA Trans 105 [Peterson]. 
18   See Andersen v St Jude Medical, Inc, 2012 ONSC 3660 (available on CanLII) at paras 
542, 544, 555, 55859 [Andersen]. 
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tion as causal if it is ninety-five per cent certain.19 However, this is a mis-
interpretation of the so-called p value, which is merely the level of statis-
tical significance used to exclude the possibility that when something 
transpires in a cohort of cases, it does so by chance (i.e., the null hypothe-
sis). When the p value falls below the threshold of 0.05, the investigator is 
able to reject the null hypothesis since there is a less than one in twenty 
chance that the link between exposure and disease is random.20 While 
there is no generally accepted standard of scientific proof for causation,21 
and neither the claimant nor the defendant is required to apply scientific 
standards of proof when determining causation on a balance of probabili-
ties,22 such a standard must be “much more than marginal”.23 In light of 
this apparent tension between the balance of probabilities standard and 
the standard of statistical significance, courts must be alert to the prob-
lem that may be faced by an expert “in readjusting his focus from the 
ninety-five per cent confidence limit approach to the balance of probabili-
ties test.”24 However, in Vadera v. Shaw25 the English Court of Appeal 
reconciled the legal standard of proof on a balance of probabilities with 
                                                   
19   See Green, “Epidemiology”, supra note 8 at 577 n 81. Equating statistical significance 
with the legal burden of proof has been described as being “like trying to find the short-
est path from Oxford to Cambridge by scrutinizing a map of London” (DH Kaye, “Ap-
ples and Oranges: Confidence Coefficients and the Burden of Persuasion” (1987) 73:1 
Cornell L Rev 54 at 66). Kaye demonstrates the distinction between statistical signifi-
cance and the civil burden of persuasion by using a hypothetical case (ibid at 66–73). 
There is often judicial reference to a statement that the level of 0.05 for statistical sig-
nificance is a much higher burden of proof than the civil burden of a preponderance of 
the evidence or balance of probabilities (that is, greater than fifty per cent): see Green, 
“Epidemiology”, supra note 8 at 577, citing In re Ephedra Products Liability Litigation, 
393 F Supp (2d) 181 at 193 (SD NY 2005); Marmo v IBP, Inc, 360 F Supp (2d) 1019 at 
1021 (D Neb 2005); Peter Feldschreiber, Leigh-Ann Mulcahy & Simon Day, “Biostatis-
tics and Causation in Medicinal Product Liability Suits” in Richard Goldberg, ed, Per-
spectives on Causation (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 179 at 190. Recent case law has referred to 
Wyeth’s citation of the Reference Manual on Scientific Evidence to point to the errone-
ous nature of this approach (see Giles v Wyeth, Inc, 500 F Supp (2d) 1048 at 1056–57 
(SD Ill 2007)). 
20    Feldschreiber, Mulcahy & Day, supra note 19 at 184, 190. 
21   See Loveday, supra note 4 at 124, Stuart-Smith LJ. 
22   See Carter v Basildon and Thurrock University Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust, 
[2007] EWHC 1882 at para 92 (available on BAILII) (QB) [Carter]. 
23   See Dingley v The Chief Constable, Strathclyde Police, 1998 SC 548 at 603 (Ct of Sess), 
[1998] GWD 677, Lord Prosser [Dingley cited to SC], aff ’d 2000 SC (HL) 77, cited in 
Sienkiewicz, supra note 15, Lord Phillips. 
24   See Carter, supra note 22 at para 97. A confidence interval or confidence limit is a 
range of values within which the true value is likely to fall (see Green, “Epidemiology” 
supra note 8 at 621; Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of Torts, supra note 2 at 
137; American Law Institute, Reporters’ Study: Enterprise Responsibility for Personal 
Injury, vol 2: Approaches to Legal and Institutional Change (Philadelphia: American 
Law Institute, 1991) at 324–28).  
25   Vadera v Shaw (1998), 45 BMLR 162 (CA), (2000) 8 Med LR 316. 
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the scientific standard of statistical significance, in holding that a failure 
to establish a statistically significant connection between the oral contra-
ceptive Logynon and the occurrence of strokes was fatal to the establish-
ment of proof of causation on a balance of probabilities. Lord Justice Hen-
ry stated: 
The judge concluded, and in our respectful view was right on the ev-
idence to conclude, that the studies carried out and referred to by Dr 
Lidegaard [for the plaintiff] did not establish a statistically signifi-
cant connection between Logynon and strokes. Such evidence can-
not be ignored by a judge. It is as common sense a conclusion as one 
could wish to say that if the connection between A and B cannot be 
shown with confidence to be other than a coincidence, then it cannot 
be held on a balance of probabilities that A caused B. This is not to 
allow scientists or statisticians to usurp the judge’s function, but ra-
ther to permit him to use their skills to discern a connection, or a 
lack of connection, between two phenomena.26 
B. Doubling of Risk Theory 
 Epidemiologists investigating disease causation measure the associa-
tion between exposure to an agent and the incidence of disease by using 
the concept of relative risk. Relative risk is defined as the ratio of the in-
cidence of a disease in a population exposed to the agent to the incidence 
of disease in a population that has not been exposed.27 For example, if ten 
per cent of all people exposed to a drug develop a disease, compared with 
five per cent of people who are unexposed, the disease occurs twice as fre-
quently among the exposed people. The relative risk is ten per cent/five 
per cent (i.e., two). A relative risk of one shows no association between ex-
posure and disease.28  
 A significant attempt to reconcile the apparent tension between the 
balance of probabilities standard and the standard for epidemiology has 
emerged with the theory that causation can be proven on the balance of 
probabilities by reference to the doubling of risk of injury theory. That 
theory has long been recognized in the United States,29 where it has been 
                                                   
26   Ibid at 174. However, it is suggested that there was a failure by the trial judge and the 
Court of Appeal to scrutinize adequately the scientific evidence in respect of causation 
in this case (see Richard Goldberg, “The Contraceptive Pill, Negligence and Causation: 
Views on Vadera v. Shaw” (2000) 8 Med L Rev 316 at 331–35). 
27   Green, “Epidemiology”, supra note 8 at 566, 627; Green, “Proportional Liability”, supra 
note 11 at 366. 
28   See ibid; Green, “Epidemiology”, supra note 8. 
29   See especially Daubert v Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 43 F (3d) 1311 (9th Cir 1995), 
63 USLW 2420, cert denied, 516 US 869, 116 S Ct 189 (1995) [Daubert II]. In that 
case, the Court of Appeals, on remand from the Supreme Court of the United States, 
held that the plaintiffs had to show not merely that Bendectin increased the likelihood 
of injury, but that it more likely than not caused their injuries. In terms of statistical 
proof, it had to be shown that plaintiffs’ mothers’ ingestion of Bendectin more than 
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said that “[t]he use of scientifically reliable epidemiological studies and 
the requirement of more than a doubling of the risk strikes a balance be-
tween the needs of our legal system and the limits of science.”30 However, 
the theory has also been subject to trenchant criticism.31 In particular, 
academics have argued that judges have adopted “substantive changes in 
causation law through the rubric of evidentiary admissibility decisions”32 
and “have frequently conflated admissibility decisions and sufficiency of 
evidence decisions.”33 Those courts which require plaintiffs to produce ep-
idemiological studies with a relative risk of two are making a “legal policy 
determination to equate epidemiology, relative risk, general causation, 
and the burden of proof on individual causation.”34 Moreover, while the to-
tal number of judicial opinions that at least mention the concept of dou-
      
doubled the likelihood of birth defects (ibid at 1320). This was reaffirmed by the Su-
preme Court of Texas in Havner, supra note 10 at 716–18. The Supreme Court of Tex-
as has now expanded on its holding in Havner and adopted the position that a dou-
bling of risk is a necessary but not sufficient condition to prove causation (see Garza, 
supra note 10 at 265). Vermont has also adopted the doubling of risk theory in a 
slightly diluted form in the context of specific causation (see Blanchard v Goodyear 
Tire and Rubber, 30 A (3d) 1271, 2011 VT 85 (Vt Sup Ct) at 1275–77). For an excellent 
discussion of the implications of both cases, see Steve C Gold, “Revisiting Relative Risk 
Rules: Garza, Blanchard, and the Ever Evolving Role of Epidemiologic Proof in Toxic 
Tort Cases” (2012) 40 Prod Safety & Liab Rep (BNA) 50 [Gold, “Revisiting Relative 
Risk Rules”]. 
30   Havner, supra note 10 at 718 (echoing the views of the court of appeals in Daubert II, 
supra note 29). 
31   See e.g. Lucinda M Finley, “Guarding the Gate to the Courthouse: How Trial Judges 
Are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort Causation Rules” (1999) 
49:2 DePaul L Rev 335  (criticizing the doubling–in–risk evidentiary requirement for 
epidemiological proof, describing the trend as “seriously scientifically and legally mis-
guided” at 348); Margaret A Berger, “Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: 
The Impact of the Supreme Court’s Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litiga-
tion” (2001) 64:2–3 Law & Contemp Probs  289 (criticizing the doubling of the risk rule 
as “a legal invention that creates a hard and fast rule that disposes of cases efficiently 
but rests on assumptions that cannot be scientifically validated at this time” at 304–
06); Sander Greenland & James M Robins, “Epidemiology, Justice, and the Probability 
of Causation” (2000) 40:3 Jurimetrics J 321 at 325–26; Mark Geistfeld, “Scientific Un-
certainty and Causation in Tort Law”’ (2001) 54:3 Vand L Rev 1011, at 1015, 1018, 
1020. 
32   Finley, supra note 31 at 336. 
33   Ibid; see also Jean Macchiaroli Eggen, “Clinical Medical Evidence of Causation in Toxic 
Tort Cases: Into the Crucible of Daubert” (2001) 38:2 Hous L Rev 369 at 378–79; Mi-
chael D Green, “The Future of Proportional Liability: The Lessons of Toxic Substances 
Causation” in M Stuart Madden, ed, Exploring Tort Law (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2005) 352 at 368–69. A recent instance of the conflation of both admissi-
bility and sufficiency of evidence requirements is Garza, supra note 10, discussed in 
Gold, “Revisiting Relative Risk Rules”, supra note 29 at 53 (where he argues that by 
framing a totality of evidence test as a matter of reliability, Garza explicitly conflated 
rules of admissibility and substantive sufficiency in the weighing of evidence). 
34   Finley, supra note 31 at 362. 
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bling of risk has increased, US courts disagree as to the proper role of the 
doubling of risk theory in deciding questions of both sufficiency and ad-
missibility of scientific evidence of causation in toxic tort cases. They do 
not agree on whether to adopt the doubling of risk as a threshold, nor do 
they agree on the meaning of such a threshold.35 As the reporters for the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement Third of Torts have noted: 
Many courts accept the doubling of the incidence of disease in group 
studies; some courts insist on doubling of risk as a minimum 
threshold for establishing specific causation. Others have recognised 
that if other known causes can be identified and eliminated, some-
thing less than a doubling would still be sufficient to find specific 
causation. 36  
Accordingly, the requirement of a relative risk of two for the admissibility 
or sufficiency of epidemiological evidence has been subject to much scepti-
cism.37 The reporters for the Restatement Third of Torts, in discussing the 
considerations that affect the appropriateness of determining the proba-
bility of specific causation based on the outcome of group studies, have 
concluded that a judicial requirement that plaintiffs show a threshold in-
crease in risk (or a doubling of incidence in a group study) to satisfy the 
burden of proof of specific causation is “usually inappropriate”.38 
 Notwithstanding the problems with the doubling of risk theory in the 
United States, its existence appears to be gaining ground in the United 
Kingdom. Of particular significance was the case XYZ v. Schering Health 
Care Ltd,39 a trial of seven lead cases in group litigation against three 
pharmaceutical companies in respect of cardiovascular injuries coming 
under the collective description of venous thromboembolism (VTE). The 
claimants alleged that their injuries were caused by taking the defend-
ants’ different brands of third-generation combined oral contraceptives. 
The claimants alleged that the products they took were defective under 
the Consumer Protection Act 1987 and the Product Liability Directive. 
While the cause of action was based on strict liability, the requirement 
common to both negligence and strict liability of proving a causal link be-
tween the product and the damage (i.e., the issue of general causation) 
emerged as the first central issue requiring determination.  
                                                   
35   Russellyn S Carruth & Bernard D Goldstein, “Relative Risk Greater Than Two in Proof 
of Causation in Toxic Tort Litigation” (2001) 41:2 Jurimetrics Journal 195 at 199, 202–
03.  
36   Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts §28(a) (2010) [Restatement].  
37   See Carl F Cranor, Toxic Torts: Science, Law and the Possibility of Justice (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007) at 234–38, 281.  
38   Restatement, supra note 36. 
39   70 BMLR 88, [2002] EWHC 1420 (QB) [XYZ]. 
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 Justice Mackay stated that the claimant could prove that an exposure 
to risk caused injury if that exposure had more than doubled the risk of 
the injury occurring.40 This method of proving causation had previously 
been applied in a case of bladder cancer, where the claimant had been tor-
tiously exposed to carcinogens and non-tortiously exposed to cigarette 
smoke, both of which are potent causes of the condition.41 However, it has 
been argued that since the doubling of risk approach is only valid where 
the risk estimate represents “mutually exclusive ways in which the injury 
may have been caused” and is sought “to estimate the likelihood it was 
one way which had operated in a particular case rather than one of the 
other possible ways.”42 As such, the doubling of risk approach is not valid-
ly applicable as a method to cases of bladder cancer, where the mecha-
nism by which an agent (e.g., amines) present in two sources (e.g., occupa-
tional amine exposure and amines contained in cigarette smoke) causes 
bladder cancer is unknown.43 By contrast, such comparisons of risk esti-
mates in the doubling of risk approach would be statistically valid where 
the estimates relate to mechanisms which, even if their details are not 
understood, are known to involve different agents, such as a birth defect 
that may be attributable either to a medicinal product or to a background 
risk.44 
                                                   
40   Ibid at para 21, Mackay J. See also Miller & Goldberg, supra note 1 at paras 17.06–
17.08. 
41   See Cookson v Novartis Grimsby Ltd, [2007] EWCA Civ 1261, [2007] All ER (D) 465 
(Nov) at para 74, Smith LJ. See also Ministry of Defence v AB, [2010] EWCA Civ 1317, 
117 BMLR 101 at 149 [AB]. In the appeal for AB (AB v Ministry of Defence, [2012] 
UKSC 9, [2013] 1 AC 78 [AB UKSC]), the UK Supreme Court found the doubling of 
risk theory relevant in the context of examining the strength of claimants’ cases on 
causation and in determining whether the trial court’s exercise of discretion under sec-
tion 33 of the Limitation Act 1980 was appropriate. The trial judge was found to have 
wrongly exercised his discretion. In dismissing the claimants’ appeals, the Supreme 
Court observed that it was undesirable that a court which conducts an inquiry into 
whether a claim is time-barred should, even when it considers its power under section 
33 of the 1980 Act, have detailed regard to the evidence with which the claimant as-
pires to prove its case. Nonetheless, because of the complexity of the claims placed be-
fore the trial judge and the nature of the submissions about knowledge in section 14(1) 
of the 1980 Act, the trial judge was able to make a “microscopic survey of the written 
evidence,” especially in respect of causation. The Court of Appeal had been unusually 
well-placed in exercising its discretion under section 33 to assess the claimants’ pro-
spects of establishing causation. Since the Court of Appeal had concluded that the 
claimants’ faced “very great difficulties” in establishing causation, and the claimants 
had no real prospects of success, it had been correct not to exercise its discretion to al-
low the claims to proceed. To have done so would have been absurd (ibid, Lord Wilson 
at 100).  
42   Jane Stapleton, “Factual Causation, Mesothelioma and Statistical Validity” (2012) 
128:2 Law Q Rev 221 at 223–25 [emphasis added]. 
43   Ibid at 226. 
44   Ibid at 223.  
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 “The utilization and value of epidemiological or statistical evidence 
alone in determining causation on a balance of probabilities was subject 
to some interesting debate in the [UK] Supreme Court in Sienkiewicz v. 
Greif.”45 The reason for this discussion, as pointed out by Baroness 
Hale,46 was the presence of an obiter observation by Lady Justice Smith 
in her judgment in Sienkiewicz that “in a case of multiple potential caus-
es, a claimant can demonstrate causation by showing that the tortious 
exposure has at least doubled the risk arising from the non-tortious cause 
or causes.”47 Their Lordships were postulating the scenario where, having 
established general causation between the toxic agent and the disease, 
epidemiological evidence might be used to establish specific causation. 
While their Lordships held unanimously that there was no room for in-
troducing the doubling of risk approach to “single exposure”48 mesotheli-
oma cases or multiple defendant mesothelioma cases,49 differences in 
view emerged with the obiter discussion of the general applicability of the 
doubling of risk theory using epidemiological evidence to determine proof 
of causation in personal injury cases.  
 Lord Phillips discussed the XYZ decision and took the view that, while 
the case contained “a detailed and illuminating discussion of epidemiolo-
gy,” it did not afford any direct assistance to the question whether the 
“doubles the risk” test—as he called it—was appropriate for determining 
causation in a case of multiple potential causes.50 His reasoning was 
somewhat obscured by his misclassification of the contraceptives in this 
                                                   
45   Richard Goldberg, “Using Scientific Evidence to Resolve Causation Problems in Prod-
uct Liability: UK, US and French Experiences” in Richard Goldberg, ed, Perspectives 
on Causation (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2011) 149 at 153. 
46   See Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at para 169. 
47   Ibid at para 63 (quoting Smith LJ in the Court of Appeal, [2010] QB 370). 
48   Ibid at para 67. As Lord Kerr noted, “[t]he use of the expression ‘single exposure’ may 
be misleading in this context” (ibid at para 199). It is probably better expressed as “sin-
gle tortious exposure cases” (ibid at para 173, Hale B). These are cases where only one 
defendant exposed the victim to asbestos and there was only one possible tortious 
source for the exposure, and the only other exposure creating a risk of developing meso-
thelioma was environmental exposure to low level asbestos dust in the general atmos-
phere (ibid at paras 113, Lord Rodger; 199, Lord Kerr; 207, Lord Dyson).  
49   Ibid at paras 106, Lord Phillips; 160, Lord Rodger; 169, Hale B; 188, Lord Mance; 203, 
Lord Kerr; 220, Lord Dyson. In such cases, the Fairchild v Glenhaven Funeral Services 
Ltd ([2002] UKHL 22, [2003] 1 AC 32) and Barker v Corus (UK) plc ([2006] UKHL 20, 
[2006] 2 AC 572) exception for mesothelioma applied to provide the claimant with an 
action if it proved that the defendant materially increased the risk that the claimant 
might develop mesothelioma (see Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at paras 103, 107, Lord 
Phillips. But now see the Supreme Court decision in Durham v BAI (Run Off) Ltd 
([2012] UK SC 14, [2012] 1 WLR 867), where the Supreme Court held that the actual 
development of mesothelioma was an essential element of the cause of action (ibid at 
paras 52, 65–66, Lord Mance; see also para 124, Lord Phillips, dissenting). 
50   Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at para 74.  
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case. He stated that the issue “was whether a second generation of oral 
contraceptives more than doubled the risk of causing deep vein throm-
bosis (DVT) that was created by the first generation of contraceptives ... It 
was not whether the DVT suffered by the claimants had been caused by 
the second generation of oral contraceptives.”51 
 In fact, the issue was whether the claimants had proved that third 
generation combined oral contraceptives caused a true excess risk of VTE, 
which was more than twice the risk caused by second generation com-
bined oral contraceptives. Both sides in XYZ agreed that if the claimants 
failed to prove this, the action could not succeed. However, both parties 
had also agreed that if the claimants could prove a true excess risk of 
VTE, they would also succeed on the second issue, which was whether the 
relevant products were defective within the meaning of section 3 of the 
Consumer Protection Act 1987 (i.e., that their safety would not be such as 
persons generally were entitled to expect)52. The test of defectiveness un-
der section 3(2)(a) of the Act includes consideration of instructions or 
warnings associated with the product. Thus, the reasoning behind the 
doubling of risk theory’s relevance to establishing that the third genera-
tion contraceptives were defective was that if the UK Supreme Court 
ruled that the true risk of VTE was more than doubled with third genera-
tion combined oral contraceptives, women and their prescribers were en-
titled to be told this before making their decisions or giving their advice, 
respectively—and they had not been.53  
 Lord Phillips’ reasoning seems to ignore the fact that causation was 
inherently behind the court’s approach. As Justice Mackay explained in 
XYZ:  
The reason why the Claimants accept, through Lord Brennan QC, 
that this first issue is capable of disposing of the claims should be 
set out. It is not because an increase of less than two would fail to 
render the product defective within the meaning of the Act, though 
the Defendants would so argue if they had to. It is for reasons of 
causation that he accepts this burden, correctly in my view. If factor 
X increases the risk of condition Y by more than two when compared 
with factor Z, it can then be said, of a group of say 100 with both ex-
posure to factor X and the condition, that as a matter of probability 
more than 50 would not have suffered Y without being exposed to X. 
If medical science cannot identify the members of the group who 
would and who would not have suffered Y, it can nevertheless be 
said of each member that she was more likely than not to have 
avoided Y had she not been exposed to X [emphasis added].54 
                                                   
51   Ibid. 
52   See XYZ, supra note 39 at para 20. 
53   Ibid at paras 20–21. See also Miller & Goldberg, supra note 1 at paras 17.06–17.08. 
54   XYZ, supra note 39 at para 21. 
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 While Lord Phillips concluded55 that there was no scope for the dou-
bling the risk test in cases where two agents operated cumulatively and 
simultaneously in causing the onset of a disease, since in such cases the 
material contribution rule in Bonnington Castings v. Wardlaw56 would 
apply, he submitted57 that there was no reason in principle why the “dou-
bles the risk test” should not be applied where the initiation of a disease 
was dose-related and there had been consecutive exposures to an agent or 
agents that cause the disease (e.g., McGhee v. National Coal Board).58 
Lord Phillips regarded Hotson v. East Berks Area Health Authority59 as 
an example of the latter situation.60  
 However, neither Lord Rodger nor Baroness Hale took such a view, 
both holding that a doubling of risk approach was not an appropriate test 
of causation.61 Lord Rodger stressed that where statistical evidence estab-
lished that exposure to a substance more than doubled the risk of a dis-
ease, this would not amount to proof, on the balance of probabilities, that 
the exposure actually caused the disease.62 Meanwhile, Lord Dyson did 
not “find it necessary to decide whether there are any circumstances in 
which, as a matter of English law, causation can be proved on the basis of 
epidemiological evidence alone.”63 He expressed the view that “there [was] 
no a priori reason why, if the epidemiological evidence [was] cogent 
enough, it should not be sufficient to enable a claimant to prove his case 
without more.”64 By contrast, Lord Kerr stressed the need to treat the use 
of epidemiological evidence to seek to establish any specific proposition in 
an individual case with great caution.65 He felt that there was a real dan-
ger that “so-called ‘epidemiological evidence’ [would] carry a false air of 
authority.”66  
 Finally, Lord Mance felt that whether and when epidemiological evi-
dence could prove a case was “a question best considered not in the ab-
stract but in a particular case, when and if that question [arises].”67 If it 
                                                   
55   See Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at para 90. 
56   Bonnington Castings Ltd v Wardlaw, [1956] AC 613 (HL Eng) at 620, Reid LJ. 
57   See Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at para 93. 
58   McGhee v National Coal Board, [1972] UKHL 7, [1973] 1 WLR 1. 
59   Hotson v East Berkshire Health Authority, [1988] UKHL 1, [1987] 1 AC 750 [Hotson]. 
60   See Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at para 93. 
61   Ibid at paras 156, 158, 161, Lord Rodger; 170, 173, Hale B.  
62   Ibid at para 156.  
63   Ibid at para 221. 
64   Ibid at para 222. 
65   Ibid at para 205. 
66   Ibid at para 206. 
67   Ibid at para 192. 
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could arise, he would hope and expect that this would only occur in the 
rarest of cases.68  
 This cautious attitude toward the use of the doubling of risk rule in 
the context of specific causation has been reflected in medicinal product 
liability litigation concerning the anti-inflammatory drug Vioxx. In Merck 
Sharp & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v. Peterson,69 plaintiffs alleged in 
representative proceedings that consumption of Vioxx increased the risk 
of a myocardial infarction (heart attack) and that Vioxx had caused or 
contributed to the myocardial infarction of the class representative, Mr. 
Peterson.70 The trial judge, Justice Jessup, had held that the epidemiolog-
ical evidence had demonstrated that Vioxx had doubled the risk of heart 
attack across the population as a whole,71 and that consumption of Vioxx 
materially contributed to Peterson’s heart attack.72 Yet in upholding 
Merck Australia’s appeal on the issue of causation, the Full Court criti-
cized the doubling of risk approach as being “apt to mandate an award of 
compensation to applicants who have not, in truth, been injured by the 
respondent.”73 It also noted that, while a relative risk of two might imply 
a fifty per cent probability that the risk had been realized in a typical 
case, a relative risk of less than two would imply a probability of less than 
fifty per cent. The trial judge’s finding of relative risk had been “about 
two”.74 
                                                   
68   Ibid. 
69   Peterson, supra note 17. 
70   Ibid at 2. 
71   Merck Sharp & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson (2010), 184 FCR 1 at para 570, 
[2011] FCAFC 128; see generally Claudia Newman-Martin, “Manufacturers’ Liability 
for Undiscoverable Design Flaws in Prescription Drugs: A Merck-Y Area of the Law” 
(2011) 19:1 Torts Law Journal 26. 
72   Peterson, supra note 17 at para 772. 
73   Ibid at para 110. This would be the case since “those applicants who were actually in-
jured by causes other than the respondent’s actionable conduct will be able to recover 
compensation because, for them too, a relative risk of greater than 2 can be said to im-
ply probability of greater than 50% that the respondent’s actionable conduct was the 
cause of their loss” (ibid). However, this criticism is misconceived, since the problem of 
compensation to those not injured by a defendant is generic in any system that uses a 
preponderance of the evidence rule and has no relevance to the type of evidence em-
ployed to determine whether the plaintiff has met the preponderance threshold. 
74   Ibid at para 111. See also Seltsam Pty Ltd v McGuiness, [2000] NSWCA 29, 49 NSWLR 
262, Spigelman CJ (while in Australian law the test of actual persuasion did not re-
quire epidemiological studies to reach the level of risk of 2.0, “the closer the ratio ap-
proaches 2.0, the greater the significance that can be attached to the studies for the 
purposes of drawing an inference of causation in an individual case. The ‘strands in the 
cable’ must be capable of bearing the weight of the ultimate inference” at para 137). 
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C. Association Versus Causation 
 It is arguable that it would be an oversimplification to think that the 
views of Lord Phillips in Sienkiewicz will help to signal a green light to 
the establishment of proof of causation on a balance of probabilities by a 
mere doubling of relative risk. The matter was addressed in Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Havner75 where, having stated that a balance be-
tween the needs of the legal system and the limits of science could be 
achieved by the use of scientifically reliable epidemiological studies and 
the requirement of more than doubling the risk, the Supreme Court of 
Texas added the caveat:  
We do not hold, however that a relative risk of more than 2.0 is a 
litmus test or that a single epidemiological test is legally sufficient 
evidence of causation. Other factors must be considered. As already 
noted, epidemiological studies only show an association. There may 
in fact be no causal relationship even if the relative risk is high.76  
 The latter sentence is of particular importance, and while Lord Phil-
lips in Sienkiewicz referred to the caveat expressed in Havner,77 he omit-
ted that last sentence and ignored its import in his final analysis. Unlike 
Lord Phillips, Lord Rodger stressed the importance of the distinction be-
tween association and causation. In this context, Lord Rodger’s reason for 
scepticism about epidemiological evidence concerns the propriety of draw-
ing causal inferences from observed associations (a general causation is-
sue); yet there is seemingly a further reason for scepticism in his speech, 
regarding the propriety of drawing causal inferences in individual cases 
from concededly causal associations observed in samples of populations (a 
specific causation issue).78 Lord Rodger’s speech is more compelling in 
that it shows a greater understanding of both the significance and the 
limitations of epidemiological evidence, and it demonstrates a reluctance 
to support the general application of the doubling of risk theory to deter-
mining proof of both general and specific causation in personal injury cas-
es.79 Lord Rodger accepted that epidemiological and statistical evidence 
may form an important element in proof of causation, and he supported 
the utilization and value of epidemiological evidence where a claimant 
was required to prove his case on a balance of probabilities.80 However, he 
                                                   
75   Havner, supra note 10. 
76   Ibid at 718. 
77   Supra note 15 at para 88.  
78   This can be contrasted with the other reason for judicial scepticism about epidemiologi-
cal evidence, namely the propriety of drawing causal inferences from observed associa-
tions. It is often difficult to tease out from the decisions which form of judicial treat-
ment is taking place.  
79   See Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at paras 163, Lord Rodger; 173, Hale B. 
80   Ibid at para 163, Lord Rodger.  
20    (2014) 59:4  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
emphasized that, since by its very nature statistical evidence does not 
deal with the individual case, the court should not proceed to find a caus-
al relationship in that particular case without further non-statistical evi-
dence (e.g., evidence of temporality of the appearance of results of the ex-
posure).81 In so doing, he cited Phipson on Evidence, which states that 
“[w]here there is epidemiological evidence of association, the court should 
not proceed to find a causal relationship without further, non-statistical 
evidence.”82 Lord Rodger illustrated his example of evidence of temporali-
ty in the context of a medicinal product and an adverse effect, where there 
was “a strong epidemiological association between a drug and some condi-
tion that could have been caused in some other way.”83 He submitted that 
epidemiological evidence, “along with evidence that the claimant devel-
oped the condition immediately after taking the drug,” could be sufficient 
to allow the judge to conclude that the drug caused the condition on the 
balance of probability.84  
 The Federal Full Court of Australia’s decision in Peterson is another 
example of courts’ reluctance to draw inferences from a population to an 
individual in the context of medicinal products.85 There the Full Court 
upheld the “but for” test of causation and found that the trial judge’s find-
ings of fact were insufficient to sustain the position that, on the balance of 
probabilities, but for the consumption of Vioxx, Peterson’s myocardial in-
farction would not have occurred.86 The court concluded that while the ep-
idemiological evidence meant that it was possible Vioxx had caused Pe-
                                                   
81   Ibid. Baroness Hale also opined that “the existence of a statistically significant associa-
tion between factor X and disease Y does not prove that in the individual case it is more 
likely than not that factor X caused disease Y” (ibid at para 170). Lord Mance accepted 
that epidemiological evidence, used with proper caution, could be admissible and rele-
vant in conjunction with specific evidence related to the individual circumstances and 
parties. The significance a court might attach to it depended “on the nature of the epi-
demiological evidence, and of the particular factual issues before the court” (ibid at pa-
ra 191). Lord Kerr considered that “[i]t is an essential and minimum requirement ... 
that there be evidence connecting avowedly relevant statistical information produced 
by the epidemiological studies to the facts of the case” (ibid at para 205). Lord Dyson 
also stressed the association/causation dichotomy, stating that “epidemiology ... seeks 
to establish associations between alleged causes and effects ... However, in an individu-
al case, epidemiology alone cannot conclusively prove causation” (ibid at para 218). See 
also the recent discussion by the High Court of Australia in Amaca Pty Ltd v Booth, 
[2011] HCA 53, 283 ALR 461 at para 49 [Amaca] (where French CJ distinguished be-
tween mere statistical correlation between conduct and injury and the need to estab-
lish causal connection between the conduct and injury). 
82   Hodge M Malek, ed, Phipson on Evidence, 17th ed (London, UK: Thomson Reuters Le-
gal, 2010) at paras 34–27.  
83   Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at para 163.  
84   Ibid.  
85   Peterson, supra note 17. 
86   Ibid at paras 103–05.  
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terson’s myocardial infarction, there were other strong potential causes, 
such as “age, gender, hypertension, hyperlipidaemia, obesity, left ven-
tricular hypertrophy and [a] history of smoking.”87 Peterson was therefore 
“a member of a group within the community, 25% of whom were expected 
by ... cardiologists to suffer a heart attack within 5 years”.88 These per-
sonal circumstances seriously diminished the strength of the epidemiolog-
ical evidence as a strand in the cable of circumstantial proof.89 According-
ly, the Full Court held that it was not more probable than not that Vioxx, 
whether alone or in combination with Peterson’s personal risk factors, 
was a necessary condition of the occurrence of his heart attack.90 While a 
relative risk of two could be converted into a fifty per cent statistical like-
lihood that Vioxx was causally implicated in the occurrence of a myocar-
dial infarction, there were other candidates as causes of the injury. The 
strength of the epidemiological strand did not rise above the possibility 
that it was “in the mix” of factors which may have caused Peterson’s heart 
attack.91 While the fact that the plaintiff in Peterson suffered from several 
personal risk factors prima facie cuts against recovery, this mere fact 
alone does not resolve the import of the epidemiological evidence. The dif-
ficulty lies with the fact that epidemiological evidence conflates people 
with different underlying conditions, and it may not be known what the 
relative risk is for those individuals with no history of heart disease com-
pared to individuals, such as Peterson, with a long history of heart dis-
ease. Indeed, there is a strong argument, based on Merck’s own VIGOR 
study of Vioxx, that the relative risk of taking Vioxx is equally strong in 
both subgroups and that Vioxx could have caused a heart attack even in 
someone with a history of heart disease.92 There is thus no data to sup-
                                                   
87   Ibid at para 120. 
88   Ibid. 
89   Ibid at para 113. 
90   Ibid at para 120. 
91   Ibid at para 123. Special leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia was refused 
since the applications were deemed not suitable vehicles for the consideration of the 
relevant questions of principle that would warrant the grant of leave, “having regard to 
the findings of fact of the primary judge and the Full Court’s treatment of them” (Pe-
terson, supra note 17, leave to appeal to HCA refused, [2012] HCATrans 105). 
92   See McDarby v Merck & Co, 949 A2d 223 at 234 (NJ Super App Div 2008) [McDarby] 
(noting that the results of the VIGOR study in March 2000 revealed a higher incidence 
of adverse cardiovascular events with those who received rofecoxib (Vioxx) than with 
those patients who received naproxen, “in patients with and without a history of ather-
osclerotic cardiovascular disease, and in patients with or without classic risk factors for 
cardiovascular disease” at 234). See also Gold, “Revisiting Relative Risk Rules”, supra 
note 29. Consider the following hypothetical. For those with no pre-existing heart prob-
lems, taking Vioxx raises the risk of heart attacks 101%, more than doubling the risk 
from 1% to 2.01%. For those with pre-existing heart conditions like Peterson, taking 
Vioxx raises the risk of heart attacks 101%, from 10% to 20.01%. Vioxx is identically 
implicated in both scenarios.  
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port the Full Court’s conclusion that personal circumstances seriously 
diminish the strength of the epidemiological evidence. Accordingly, the 
court’s approach was arguably a guess by a sceptical court that Vioxx is 
incapable of being identically implicated both in cases of individuals with 
pre-existing heart problems and in cases of those without. 
 In light of Lord Rodger’s observations in Sienkiewicz, and from the 
perspective of the propriety of drawing causal inferences from observed 
associations, the mere existence of a statistically significant association is 
insufficient to establish a causal relationship without the presence of fur-
ther non-statistical evidence. To establish a causal relationship, factors 
such as those enumerated by Sir Austin Bradford Hill would need to be 
utilized to determine whether a reported association is causal.93 This point 
was emphasized by the Scottish Court of Session in McTear v. Imperial 
Tobacco Ltd,94 a decision which takes a cautious approach to the use of ep-
idemiological evidence and stresses the impossibility of applying epidemi-
ological studies to determine causation in individual cases. The case illus-
trates the court’s scepticism about the epidemiological evidence, as the 
court questioned the propriety of drawing causal inferences from observed 
associations when determining general causation. The court was also 
sceptical about the propriety of drawing causal inferences in individual 
cases from causal associations observed in samples of populations. While 
this case concerns tobacco products, its implications are particularly per-
tinent to problems involving medicinal products, where the role of epide-
miological evidence in proving both general and specific causation is 
prominent.  
                                                   
93   Sir Austin Bradford Hill, “The Environment and Disease: Association or Causation?” 
(1965) 58:5 Proceedings of the Royal Society of Medicine 295 at 295 [Hill, “Association 
or Causation”]. These aspects of association (that is, strength of association, con-
sistency, specificity, temporality, biological gradient, plausibility, coherence, experi-
ment, and analogy) are utilized to determine whether a reported association is causal 
or non-genuine. For recent support for the Bradford Hill factors as providing a guide 
to the kind of considerations that lead to an inference of causal association, see 
Amaca, supra note 81 at para 49. 
94   McTear, supra note 16 at para 6.158. However, the presentation of the list of factors in 
textbooks as “criteria” for inferring causality or associations in a way as to imply that 
all the conditions are necessary has been described as “unfortunate” (Sander Green-
land, ed, The Evolution of Epidemiologic Ideas: Annotated Readings on Concepts and 
Methods (Los Angeles: Epidemiology Resources Inc, 1987) at 14). As Greenland cor-
rectly observes, Sir Austin Bradford Hill expressly stated that he did not intend to lay 
down “hard and fast rules of evidence that must be obeyed before we accept cause and 
effect” (ibid, citing Hill, “Association and Causation”, supra note 93 at 299). Hill added 
that “[n]one of [his] nine viewpoints can bring indisputable evidence for or against the 
cause-and-effect hypothesis and none can be required as a sine qua non” (ibid at 299 
[emphasis in original]). See also Cranor, supra note 37 at 102–05.  
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 UK developments in this area have often focused on the difficulty in 
proving general and specific causation using epidemiological evidence95 
derived from trends in general populations. This was graphically illus-
trated by McTear. In that case, the pursuer, the widow of a smoker, 
sought to recover damages from the defenders, who had manufactured 
the John Player brand cigarettes that the pursuer’s late husband had 
smoked. The pursuer’s husband had contracted squamous cell carcinoma 
of the lung, and the pursuer averred both that cigarette smoking could 
cause lung cancer (an issue of general causation) and that her husband’s 
lung cancer was caused by his smoking (an issue of individual or specific 
causation). 
 The problem of establishing a general causal link between cigarette 
smoking and cancer was exacerbated by the fact that, unlike all the ciga-
rette companies in the United States and all the other cigarette compa-
nies in the United Kingdom, Imperial Tobacco had not accepted that there 
was a causal link between smoking and disease, especially lung cancer.96 
In respect of establishing general causation, Lord Nimmo Smith conclud-
ed that, in the absence of such an admission, and indeed of any evidence 
that this was an inference that should be drawn, the burden of proof lay 
on the pursuer to show that cigarette smoking could cause lung cancer.97 
In the absence of support from animal experiments, proof of causation be-
tween cigarette smoking and lung cancer depended on what was proven 
before the court about epidemiological studies.  
 Lord Nimmo Smith held that, in accordance with the Scots law of ex-
pert evidence, it was necessary to consider whether the evidence of any 
expert witness had imparted to the court special knowledge of the subject 
matter of epidemiology so as to enable the court to draw its own conclu-
sions from epidemiological evidence. Accordingly, it was not open to the 
court to form its judgment on the evidence without being taught how to 
                                                   
95   Epidemiology has been defined as “the study of patterns of disease occurring in human 
populations and the factors that influence these patterns” (McTear, supra note 16 at 
para 6.157). 
96   See ibid at paras 2.58, 2.76, 6.30. This was notwithstanding the generally accepted 
view for over 50 years that cigarette smoking could cause lung cancer (see Richard Doll 
& A Bradford Hill, “Smoking and Carcinoma of the Lung: Preliminary Report” [1950] 
4682 Brit Med J 739; Richard Doll & A Bradford Hill, “The Mortality of Doctors in rela-
tion to their Smoking Habits: A Preliminary Report” [1954] 4877 Brit Med J 1451; 
McTear, supra note 16 at para 5.208 (evidence of Sir Richard Doll)). The defence in 
McTear admitted that the World Health Organization, along with United Kingdom and 
United States governments, had accepted for years that cigarette smoking can cause 
lung cancer. However, they averred that “[c]igarette smoking has not been scientifically 
established as a cause of lung cancer and, although various theories have been ad-
vanced, the cause or causes of lung cancer are unknown and the mechanism or mecha-
nisms whereby lung cancer develops are unknown” (ibid at para 2.7).  
97   See ibid at paras 2.78, 2.80. 
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analyze the epidemiological evidence to a sufficient extent, and without 
being provided with sufficient factual material to enable proof on the bal-
ance of probabilities not only that there was an association between ciga-
rette smoking and lung cancer, but also that the proper conclusion to be 
drawn from this was that there was a causal connection between them.98 
This distinction between association and causation in the context of the 
general causation issue lay at the heart of Lord Nimmo Smith’s conclu-
sions. In his view, when an association between an exposure and a condi-
tion was judged to be statistically significant, that in itself did not consti-
tute a judgment that there was a causal connection between an exposure 
and a condition.99 He explained: 
The finding of an association between an exposure and a condition 
or disease, even if judged to be statistically significant, does not of 
itself connote that a causal connection between the two is estab-
lished. This is a matter for further exercise of judgment, taking ac-
count of such criteria as the consistency, the strength, the specificity, 
the temporal relationship and the coherence of the association ... 
This must, I think, especially be so when, in the view of Sir Richard 
Doll ... cigarette smoking is not a necessary cause nor a sufficient 
cause of lung cancer[.]100  
  Lord Nimmo Smith then addressed the concept of relative risk, 
concluding that even a relative risk derived from comparison of the inci-
dence of lung cancer in smokers and non-smokers, of a magnitude such 
that a positive association may be judged to be strong enough to establish 
causation between the two, did not connote the establishment of a causal 
link.101  
 As we shall now see, this scepticism about epidemiological evidence 
and questions about the propriety of drawing causal inferences from ob-
served associations was not the only problem that the pursuer had in es-
tablishing general causation in McTear. The court also had to be taught 
the relevant epidemiology. 
D. Teaching Courts Epidemiology 
 In respect of general causation, Lord Nimmo Smith held that the pur-
suer had failed to prove, in accordance with the requirements of the Scots 
law of evidence relating to expert witnesses, that cigarette smoking could 
cause lung cancer.102 This was because the pursuer had failed to lead suf-
ficient evidence, in the form of primary epidemiological literature that 
                                                   
98   See ibid at para 6.155. 
99   See ibid at para 6.158. 
100  Ibid. 
101  See ibid at para 6.159. 
102  Ibid at paras 6.170. 
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drew a causal connection between cigarette smoking and lung cancer, to 
impart to the court special knowledge of the subject matter so as to enable 
the court to form its own judgment about it and the conclusions to be 
drawn from it.103 Lord Nimmo Smith stated that “a fundamental defect in 
the presentation of the pursuer’s case” was the failure to present in court 
any of the primary literature that had concluded that there was a causal 
connection between cigarette smoking and lung cancer.104 In his view, this 
was a missed opportunity: 
This could have been done: it is clear that the survey of British doc-
tors, on which Sir Richard Doll and colleagues have worked for 
many years, is regarded as a classic of its kind, both because of the 
pioneering nature of the research, a preliminary report of which was 
published as Doll and Hill (1950), and because this has been fol-
lowed up with subsequent papers over several decades. I could at 
least have been shown these papers, which I assume disclosed the 
data, the statistical techniques and all the other considerations 
which led to the authors’ conclusions, so that I could see for myself 
whether these conclusions were soundly based. The opportunity was 
there, with Sir Richard Doll in the witness box, and indeed 
Prof[essor] Friend for one thought that evidence would be given 
about this survey. Warning had been given on behalf of [Imperial 
Tobacco Ltd] ... that Sir Richard Doll’s data were of potential inter-
est to the court. But in the event no attempt was made to show me 
the data.105  
 A recent Scottish case, Smith v. McNair,106 reaffirms this cautious ap-
proach to the interpretation of epidemiological evidence.107 It stresses the 
need for experts to teach a court how to analyze epidemiological evidence 
before it can come to a judgment by interpreting that evidence. While ac-
knowledging that medical witnesses are entitled to refer to medical litera-
ture—in particular to published papers by epidemiologists—even if they 
themselves are not epidemiologists,108 Lord McEwan in McNair stressed 
the need to look at such evidence critically because its writers could not 
be cross-examined themselves. Such scientific evidence only becomes a 
factor for consideration if it is “intelligible, convincing and tested”.109 Ac-
cordingly, in Scotland, the cases are at one in emphasizing that where a 
                                                   
103  Ibid at paras 6.155, 6.162–6.163.  
104  Ibid at para 6.163. 
105  Ibid at para 6.162. 
106  [2008] CSOH 154 (available on WL UK) (OH Scot) [McNair]; see also Richard Gold-
berg, “Causation, Idiopathic Conditions and the Limits of Epidemiology” (2009) 13:2 Ed 
L Rev 282.  
107  See Dingley, supra note 23 at 555, Lord President Rodger; 604, Lord Prosser, concur-
ring; McTear, supra note 16 at 5.11, Lord Nimmo Smith. 
108  Main v McAndrew Wormald Ltd (1988), [1988] SLT 141 at 142. 
109  McNair, supra note 1086 at para 18, citing Davie v Magistrates of Edinburgh (1952), 
1953 SC 34 at 40, 1953 SLT 54 Ct Sess (Scot). 
26    (2014) 59:4  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
pursuer seeks to rely on epidemiological evidence of disease to prove cau-
sation, the pursuer must impart to the court special knowledge of the sub-
ject matter of epidemiology, so that the court can form its reasoned judg-
ment on the epidemiological evidence.110  
 Such a cautious approach to epidemiological evidence was central to 
the decision in McNair. While sympathetic to the experts who were “out-
with their chosen discipline and abroad in the field of epidemiology,”111 
Lord McEwan concluded nonetheless that the experts were unable to ex-
plain the studies, which seemed to him to “raise more questions than an-
swers.”112 Unlike McTear, however, McNair shows less of an impression of 
what Chris Miller has described as a “dogmatic aversion”113 to statistical 
evidence. Lord McEwan felt that many of the concerns about the evidence 
might have been assuaged if the authors of the reports had been called to 
testify and if there had been some statistical evidence presented. Without 
such assistance, the judge was “at once disabled from being able properly 
to evaluate the worth of the study or to draw the proper conclusions.”114 
In his view, therefore, this was an appropriate case for epidemiologists to 
give evidence and for experts to explain their studies. He did not, howev-
er, believe that this was always the case, and he suggested that reliance 
on doctors and epidemiologists “can almost lead the court unwittingly into 
a kind of satellite litigation on issues away from the pursuer’s case.”115 He 
seemed to regard McTear and another Scottish decision, Dingley,116 as two 
recent examples of this.117 However, the use of statistics in determining 
causation is hardly satellite litigation. In both McTear and Dingley, it was 
a primary issue which required resolution in the face of scientific uncer-
tainty. The concern with Scots law taking such a cautious approach to ep-
idemiological evidence is therefore that such an approach may make it 
harder to even discern that there is any possible reconciliation of the legal 
                                                   
110  See also United States, the Advisory Committee Note (2000 Amendment) to Fed R Evi-
dence 702. The Amendment not only stresses that the expert conducts the application 
of principles and methods to the facts of cases reliably, but also reiterates the “venera-
ble practice of using expert testimony to educate the factfinder on general principles” 
(ibid). It notes that it might be important in some cases for an expert to educate the 
finder of fact about general principles, without ever attempting to apply these princi-
ples to the specific facts of the case (ibid).  
111  McNair, supra note 106 at para 80. 
112  Ibid at para 81. 
113  Chris Miller, “Causation in Personal Injury: Legal or Epidemiological Common Sense” 
(2006) 26:4 LS 544 at 566 [Miller, “Causation in Personal Injury”]. 
114  McNair, supra note 106 at para 80. 
115  Ibid at para 16. 
116  Dingley, supra note 23. 
117  McNair, supra note 106 at paras 27, 29. 
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standard of proof on a balance of probabilities with the scientific standard 
of statistical significance.  
 Even more importantly, there is also concern that the placing an obli-
gation on a plaintiff to teach epidemiology to a court suggests that the 
court can remain passive in this process. This is surely an unhelpful ap-
proach in cases such as McTear and in cases involving adverse reactions 
allegedly caused by medicinal products. In such cases, there is a clear so-
cial expectation that judges will resolve these matters to the satisfaction 
of both parties. As a leading American judge has observed about cases 
where judges preside over non-jury trials: 
Passivity of the court is no virtue when serious scientific questions 
of more than passing importance are involved. The court owes an 
obligation to the parties, to society, and to itself to assist in obtain-
ing the best possible answers to the scientific questions before it. 
That will mean forcing the parties to gather and present evidence 
effectively, calling upon other experts as necessary, and studying to 
obtain the understanding needed to maintain effective control.118 
 Had the pursuer in McTear explained the epidemiological evidence 
properly, and had Lord Nimmo Smith been more receptive to evidence of 
relative risk as well as taken a more active role in forcing the pursuer to 
present her evidence effectively, it would seem that general causation 
could have been established. Moreover, Lord Nimmo Smith should have 
given more weight119  to the surely important fact that the defenders ad-
mitted that the World Health Organization, along with the governments 
of the United Kingdom and the United States, had accepted for many 
years that cigarette smoking can cause lung cancer.120  
 Of course, irrespective of the conclusions on general causation, there 
remained the problem of establishing individual causation in the context 
of “naked statistical evidence”.121 It is to this that we now turn.  
                                                   
118  Jack B Weinstein, “Improving Expert Testimony” (1986) 20:3 U Rich L Rev 473 at 
49596. Judge Weinstein also encourages judges presiding over non-jury trials “to be-
come familiar with the scientific background by reading about the issues and discuss-
ing them with the experts” (ibid at 494). Weinstein is cited in Snyder v United States 
(Department of Health & Human Services) 2009 WL 332044 at 2 (Ct Fed Cl 2009). 
119  Counsel for the pursuer had submitted (unsuccessfully) that considerable weight 
should be placed on the fact that this proposition had come to be generally accepted 
(see McTear, supra note 16 at para 6.41). 
120  Ibid at paras 2.7, 6.30.  
121  As Gary Wells has observed, the term “naked statistical evidence” is ill-defined in the 
legal literature (see e.g. David Kaye’s use of the term in in David Kaye, “Naked Statis-
tical Evidence”, Book Review of Quantitative Methods in Law: Studies in the Applica-
tion of Mathematical Probability and Statistics to Legal Problems by Michael Finkel-
stein, (1980) 89:3 Yale LJ 601 at 603; David Kaye, “The Limits of the Preponderance of 
the Evidence Standard: Justifiably Naked Statistical Evidence and Multiple Causa-
tion” (1982) 7:2 Law & Soc Inquiry 487 at 488), though it typically refers to probabili-
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E. The Statistical Chance/Personal Chance Dichotomy 
 It has been argued that there is a dichotomy between two kinds of 
chances—one “statistical” and the other “personal”. A statistical chance is 
a figure collected from “previous unconnected outcomes, giving a probabil-
ity of that outcome in any non-individual case,” whereas a personal 
chance is “peculiar to a particular individual.”122 A statistical chance has 
no compensatory value, until the data is “personalised”.123 
 The impossibility of applying statistics derived from epidemiological 
studies to determine causation in individual cases was cited as the prin-
cipal reason for the pursuer’s failure to prove individual, or specific, cau-
sation in McTear. Epidemiological evidence could not prove that it was 
more likely than not that but for his smoking of cigarettes, the deceased 
would not have contacted lung cancer.124 As Lord Nimmo Smith put it:  
The information provided in an observational epidemiology is gen-
erally such that it can neither confirm nor refute a causal relation-
ship, particularly when the exposure in question is not specifically 
associated with a certain condition (ie the exposure is always asso-
ciated with the condition, and vice versa). Epidemiology cannot pro-
vide information on the likelihood that an exposure produced an in-
dividual’s condition. The population attributable risk is a measure 
for populations only and does not imply a likelihood of disease oc-
currence within an individual, contingent upon that individual’s ex-
posure. The fact that cases and non–cases can emerge both from the 
unexposed and the exposed groups show that the likelihood of the 
individual occurrence cannot be reliably predicted from his or her 
exposure group membership alone. The group estimates obscure the 
underlying heterogeneity of the population, so that it is entirely pos-
sible that other group memberships besides exposure, like genetic 
profile, socio-economic status, workplace, diet and other exposures 
make a major contribution to disease occurrence. The question of us-
ing epidemiological data for individual causation raises the problem 
of identifying a particular individual who was harmed by the expo-
sure. While models such as the assigned share concept, derived from 
attributable fractions, have attempted to deal with this, they suffer 
      
ties that are not case specific to the events in issue “but rather existed prior to or inde-
pendently of the particular case being tried” (Gary L Wells, “Naked Statistical Evidence 
of Liability: Is Subjective Probability Enough?” (1992) 62:5 Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology 739 at 739). 
122  Timothy Hill, “A Lost Chance for Compensation in the Tort of Negligence by the House 
of Lords” (1991) 54:4 Mod L Rev 511 at 512 [Hill, “Lost Chance”]. 
123  Ibid at 518. See also Hotson v East Berkshire AHA, [1987] 2 WLR 287, 303769, Croom-
Johnson LJ. 
124  See McTear, supra note 16 at paras 6.180, 6.184–6.185. See also the above discussion in 
Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at paras 163, 170, 191, 205, 218.  As in the UK, US courts 
often bifurcate both specific and general causation elements (see Joseph Sanders, “The 
Controversial Comment C: Factual Causation in Toxic-Substance and Disease Cases” 
(2009) 44:4 Wake Forest L Rev 1029 at 1032). 
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from the limitations mentioned by Dr Lewis. The attempt to identify 
exposure as the sole cause of disease in an individual produces a 
statement counter to fact in that it implies that the individual 
would have remained healthy if the exposure had not occurred. 
This, as Dr Lewis said, is not provable and cannot be derived from 
epidemiological data.125 
 Lord Nimmo Smith concluded that, given there were other possible 
causes of lung cancer other than cigarette smoking, and given that lung 
cancer could occur in a non-smoker, it was not possible to determine in 
any individual case whether but for an individual’s cigarette smoking he 
probably would not have contracted lung cancer.126 In doing so, Lord 
Nimmo Smith referred to “[t]he fallacy of applying statistical probability 
to individual causation.”127 
 However, his dicta require closer scrutiny. While Lord Nimmo Smith 
was correct to observe that there are limitations to epidemiological evi-
dence, his description of these limitations is somewhat inaccurate. In stat-
ing that “group estimates obscure the underlying heterogeneity of the 
population, so that it is entirely possible that other group memberships 
besides exposure, like genetic profile, socio–economic status, workplace, 
diet and other exposures make a major contribution to disease occur-
rence,”128 he fails to appreciate that epidemiologists can and do adjust for 
these potentially confounding factors through logistic regression statisti-
cal techniques.129 Notwithstanding Lord Nimmo Smith’s doubts about 
causal proof based on population estimates of relative risk, these esti-
mates are relevant to individual cases, even though they do not directly 
measure the probability of causation in an individual case.130 Moreover, 
Miller has suggested that, while Lord Nimmo Smith’s “dogmatic aversion 
to statistical evidence” means that epidemiology alone will never secure 
recovery in respect of specific causation in such cases,131 use of epidemio-
logical evidence that satisfies the criteria developed by Sir Austin Brad-
                                                   
125  McTear, supra note 16 at para 6.180. 
126  Ibid at paras 6.184–6.185. 
127  Ibid at para 6.184. For the need to exercise caution in the use of general statistics in es-
tablishing causation, and the importance of looking at the claimant’s individual cir-
cumstances, see the observations of Brooke LJ in Wardlaw v Farrar, [2003] EWCA Civ 
1719, [2003] 4 All ER 1358. See also Amaca Pty Ltd v Ellis, [2010] HCA 5 at para 62, 
263 ALR 576; Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at paras 152, 163, Lord Rodger; 170, 172, 
Hale B; 190–92, Lord Mance; 204–06, Lord Kerr. 
128  McTear, supra note 16 at para 6.180.  
129  See also Kenneth J Rothman & Sander Greenland, Modern Epidemiology, 2d ed (Phil-
adelphia, Lippincott-Raven Publishers, 1998) at 394–95.  
130  See Steve C Gold, “When Certainty Dissolves Into Probability: A Legal Vision of Toxic 
Causation for the Post-Genomic Era” (2013) 70:1 Wash & Lee L Rev 237 at 281, 303 
[Gold, “Certainty Dissolves”]; Greenland & M Robins, supra note 31 at 321–22. 
131  See Miller, “Causation in Personal Injury”, supra note 113 at 566. 
30    (2014) 59:4  MCGILL LAW JOURNAL — REVUE DE DROIT DE MCGILL  
 
 
ford Hill would seem to be hard to gainsay.132 Thus, Miller has argued 
that if an individual had been one of the cases in a case control study that 
yields strength of association (relative risk), then in light of such strength 
of association and other Bradford Hill criteria, “it seems perverse to hold 
that it is less probable than not that the exposure caused that individual’s 
condition.”133 I contend that Miller is correct in concluding that a causal 
relationship would exist in such circumstances. Indeed, Sir Austin Brad-
ford Hill emphasized that “[n]one of my nine viewpoints can bring indis-
putable evidence for or against the cause-and-effect hypothesis and none 
can be required as a sine qua non,”134 and this has been judicially ap-
proved in the United States.135 Sir Austin Bradford Hill specifically cau-
tioned against overly emphasizing the importance of specificity at the ex-
pense of strength of association, referring specifically to smoking and lung 
cancer. 136 In doing so, he provided a particularly apt example:  
Coming to modern times the prospective investigations of smoking 
and cancer of the lung have been criticized for not showing specifici-
ty—in other words the death rate of smokers is higher than the 
death rate of non-smokers from many causes of death. ... But here 
surely one must return to my first characteristic, the strength of as-
sociation. If other causes of death are raised 10, 20 or even 50% in 
smokers whereas cancer of the lung is raised 900–1,000% we have 
specificity—a specificity in the magnitude of the association. 
... 
We must also keep in mind that diseases may have more than one 
cause. 
... 
In short, if specificity exists we may be able to draw conclusions 
without hesitation; if it is not apparent, we are not thereby neces-
sarily left sitting irresolutely on the fence.137 
 I suggest that Lord Nimmo Smith in McTear undervalued the signifi-
cance of the widely accepted magnitude of strength of association between 
cigarette smoking and cancer, and that he was wrong to treat the Brad-
ford Hill factors as criteria that all needed to be satisfied before such an 
association could amount to a causal connection between smoking and 
lung cancer. In his discussion of the impossibility of applying statistics de-
                                                   
132  Ibid.  
133  Ibid [emphasis in original]. 
134  Hill, “Association or Causation”, supra note 93 at 299 [emphasis in original].  
135  See Cook v Rockwell Intern Corp, 580 F Supp 2d 1071 at 1098 (D Colo 2006). 
136  Hill, “Association or Causation”, supra note 93 at 297. The High Court of Australia has 
recently stressed that reference to relative risk ratio may act as an indicator of 
strength of association (see Amaca, supra note 81 at para 49). 
137  Hill, “Association or Causation”, supra note 93 at 297. 
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rived from epidemiological studies to determine causation in individual 
cases, Lord Nimmo Smith failed to appreciate that, in determining specif-
ic causation, epidemiologists can and do adjust for potentially confound-
ing factors through logistic regression techniques and other forms of sta-
tistical refining mechanisms. It is to these techniques that we now turn. 
F. Overcoming the Statistical Chance/Personal Chance Dichotomy: Statistical 
Refining Mechanisms Using Specific Risk Factors 
 The problem of using statistics deriving from trends in general popu-
lations to prove causation in an individual case has been recognized judi-
cially by the House of Lords in Hotson v. East Berkshire Area Health Au-
thority138 and in Gregg v. Scott,139 and by the UK Supreme Court in Sien-
kiewicz v. Greif.140 
 Yet it is arguable that while epidemiological evidence reaches conclu-
sions on the incidence of a disease in a population in the form of relative 
risk, this relative risk can be refined to draw conclusions about the cause 
of disease in an individual using specific risk factors,141 such as those pre-
sent in Mr. McTear’s case and in Mr. Peterson’s case. This has been ac-
cepted by American courts in the context of pharmaceutical product liabil-
ity litigation.142 In McDarby v. Merck & Co, Inc.,143 a case involving the 
drug Vioxx, epidemiological evidence was combined by experts with the 
presence of the plaintiff ’s personal heart attack risk factors, namely his 
age, low levels of “good” cholesterol, weight, and diabetes. The New Jersey 
court regarded this as ample evidence to support an increased risk result-
ing from the combined effects of diabetes and Vioxx, and concluded that 
Vioxx had been a substantial contributing factor to the plaintiff ’s heart 
attack.144 In so concluding, the court applied a substantial factor standard 
                                                   
138  Hotson, supra note 59 at 789, Lord Mackay. 
139  See Gregg v Scott, [2005] UKHL 2, [2004] 2 AC 176 at paras 26–33, Lord Nicholls; 153, 
Lord Phillips.  
140  Sienkiewicz, supra note 15 at paras 152, 163, Lord Rodger; 170, 172, Hale B; 190–92, 
Lord Mance; 205, Lord Kerr.  
141  See Berger, supra note 31 at 306.  
142  Green, “Epidemiology”, supra note 8 at 616, citing Havner, supra note 10 at 720; see 
also Smith v Wyeth Ayerst Laboratories Co, 278 F Supp (2d) 684 at 708–09 (WDNC 
2003) (discussing an expert’s attempt to apply principles of relative risk from an epi-
demiological study on the relationship between diet drugs and primary pulmonary hy-
pertension (PPH) to the risk faced by the individual plaintiff, who developed PPH after 
taking prescription appetite suppressants based on specific risk characteristics (dura-
tion of use and timing of use). The expert’s opinion was deemed unreliable). 
143  McDarby, supra note 92 at 270. 
144  Ibid at 269–70. 
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in the context of concurrent causation, in preference to the “but for” 
test.145  
 In this context, I have suggested that statistics regarding evidence of 
general causal links between a drug and an injury (a statistical chance) 
could be refined into statistics establishing a specific causal link between 
the drug and the adverse reaction in the case at issue (a personal 
chance)146 using logistic regression techniques and other forms of statisti-
cal refining mechanisms.147  
 Logistic regression techniques identify determinants of a particular 
outcome and assess the extent of the contribution of these determinants, 
adjusting for confounding factors148 that may influence the contribution.149 
Logistic regression is also closely linked to other forms of statistical refin-
ing, such as Bayes’ theorem. Bayes’ theorem can modify evaluations of 
probability based on initial assumptions in the light of more data that 
later becomes available. It expresses the relationship between the proba-
bility of a proposition (A) evaluated before the utilization of new data (B) 
(prior probability), and the probability of the same proposition evaluated 
after the utilization of the new data (posterior probability). 
Thus: 
Posterior 
Probability 
of A given B 
= 
Prior Probability of A 
x 
Probability of B given A 
1 Unconditional Probability 
of B 
i.e. P(A/B)     =     P(A)     x     [P(B/A) / P(B)] 
 Prior probabilities can therefore be updated in the light of new data 
from epidemiological studies as they accumulate, providing both fact find-
ers in individual product liability cases, and policy-makers such as the 
Food and Drug Administration and the European Medicines Agency, with 
                                                   
145  Ibid (applying the substantial factor standard, causation was appropriately demon-
strated by long term use of Vioxx and “medical and/or scientific proof of a nexus be-
tween [that use] and ... plaintiff ’s condition” at 271).  
146   Hill, “Lost Chance”, supra note 122 at 518. 
147  This builds on the author’s discussion in Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of 
Torts, supra note 2 at 39–40. 
148  A confounding factor is a factor that is both a risk factor for the disease and one associ-
ated with the exposure in issue. “Confounding” refers to the situation where an associ-
ation between an exposure and an outcome is all or partly due to a factor that affects 
the outcome but which is unaffected by the exposure (see Green, “Epidemiology”, supra 
note 8 at 621). 
149  Rothman & Greenland, supra note 129; O Caster et al, “Logistic Regression in Signal 
Detection: Another Piece Added to the Puzzle”, Letter to the Editor, (2013) 94:3 Clinical 
Pharmacology & Therapeutics 312.  
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an update of the estimated risk.150 The main difficulty with such posterior 
probabilities is that frequentist statisticians151 who rely on epidemiologi-
cal evidence regard them as necessarily subjective, since they reflect not 
only data but also subjective prior probabilities.152 However, “objective 
Bayesians”153 use Bayes’ theorem without eliciting prior probabilities from 
subjective beliefs, avoiding the charge of subjectivism.154 This has been 
supported in the pharmaceutical product liability context by Professor Jo-
seph Gastwirth, who has adopted a data-based approach to ensure that 
the choice of prior distribution is objective and unbiased. He uses the first 
case control study or an analysis of adverse event and case reports to de-
termine two prior distributions, one the most favourable to the defendant, 
and the other centred on or near the estimated relative risk from the first 
study. This method of determining two prior distributions restricts the 
degree of subjectivity that an analyst can insert into a Bayesian ap-
proach. This is very important in the legal context, where lawyers would 
likely choose the expert who obtains the more favourable result for them. 
The data-based approach helps to avoid bias in the choice of prior distri-
bution.155 Others have also tried to apply Bayes’ theorem in the evaluation 
of the reliability of medical and scientific evidence in toxic tort cases.156 
However, the strongest criticism of Bayes’ theorem is the difficulty of ar-
                                                   
150  See Joseph L Gastwirth, “Should Law and Public Policy Adopt ‘Practical Causality’ as 
the Appropriate Criteria for Deciding Product Liability Cases and Public Policy?” 
(2013) 12:3 Law, Probability and Risk 169 [Gastwirth, “Practical Causality”]; see also 
Patrick Ryan et al, “Learning from Epidemiology: Interpreting Observational Database 
Studies for the Effects of Medical Products” (2013) 5:3 Statistics in Biopharmaceutical 
Research 170 at 178 (supporting a Bayesian framework to interpret observational da-
tabase studies for the effects of medical products and suggesting that future work can 
extend the Bayesian framework to include such elements as the Bradford Hill factors). 
151  Frequentist statisticians are those who define probability as the frequency of a certain 
measurement or observation. The frequentist approach focuses on the probability of the 
data, given the hypothesis. See Maarten HP Ambaum, “Frequentist vs Bayesian Sta-
tistics—A Non-Statisticians [sic] View” (July 2012), online: Department of Meteorology, 
University of Reading, UK 
<www.met.reading.ac.uk/~sws97mha/Publications/Bayesvsfreq.pdf>. 
152  See David H Kaye & David A Freedman, “Reference Guide on Statistics” in Reference 
Manual on Scientific Evidence, 3d ed (Washington, DC: National Academies Press, 
2011) 211 at 258, 273. 
153  Bayesian statisticians define probability as the plausibility of a hypothesis given in-
complete knowledge or data (see Ambaum, supra note 150). 
154  Kaye & Freedman, supra note 152 at 259 n 123. 
155  Gastwirth, “Practical Causality”, supra note 150. 
156  See e.g. Neal C Stout & Peter A Valberg, “Bayes’ Law, Sequential Uncertainties, and 
Evidence of Causation in Toxic Tort Cases” (2005) 38:4 Mich JL Reform 781 at 787 
(submitting that judges should apply Bayesian probabilistic approaches in toxic tort 
cases when evaluating the reliability of medical and scientific evidence, and in so doing 
permitting the fact finder to decide only those toxic tort claims for which there is relia-
ble and relevant scientific support for each link in the causal chain).  
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riving at a sufficiently accurate evaluation of a pre-existing probability to 
which experimental data can be applied.157 
 Bayes’ theorem tells us that the value of a piece of evidence in testing 
a particular assertion is determined by its likelihood ratio. The likelihood 
ratio (LR) is the probability of the evidence supposing our assertion is 
true, divided by the probability of the evidence if the assertion is not 
true.158 The Centre for Evidence Based Medicine at the University of Ox-
ford provides a helpful example of the LR in the following:  
[Y]ou have a patient with anaemia and a serum ferritin of 60mmol/l 
and you find in an article that 90 per cent of patients with iron defi-
ciency anaemia have serum ferritins in the same range as your pa-
tient (= sensitivity) and that 15 per cent of patients with other caus-
es for anaemia have serum ferritins in the same range as your pa-
tient (1 – specificity). This means that your patient’s result would be 
six times as likely (90/15) to be seen in someone with, as opposed to 
someone without, iron deficiency anaemia, and this is called the LR 
for a positive test result.159 
 An alternative statement of Bayes’ theorem explains it in terms of 
odds.160 Bayes’ theorem expresses the relationship between the odds in fa-
vour of a hypothesis before the utilization of new data (prior odds) and the 
odds in favour of the hypothesis after taking into account the new data 
(posterior odds). The prior odds must be multiplied by the likelihood ratio 
of the new piece of data to generate the posterior odds. 
 Thus:  
  Posterior Odds = Prior Odds x Likelihood Ratio  
 Applying this to the Peterson case,161 “Vioxx-induced MI” could be 
compared with a catch-all alternative, “no Vioxx-induced MI”. Alterna-
tively, one could compare “Vioxx-induced MI” with some specific alterna-
tive, such as “diet-induced MI”, “totally uncaused MI”, or “no MI”. The 
likelihood ratio would then be the ratio of the probabilities of developing 
MI under these two hypotheses.162  
                                                   
157  See Sir Richard Eggleston, Evidence, Proof and Probability, 2d ed, (London, UK: Wei-
denfeld and Nicolson, 1983) at 171.  
158  See Bernard Robertson & GA Vignaux, Interpreting Evidence: Evaluating Forensic 
Science in the Courtroom (Chichester, UK; John Wiley & Sons 1995) at 17.  
159  Centre for Evidence Based Medicine, “Likelihood Ratios”, online: CEBM 
<www.cebm.net/?o=1043>. 
160  The relationship between odds and probability is: 
Odds = Probability / (1 – Probability) 
    Thus the probability of 0.9 = odds of 9:1.  
161  Peterson, supra note 17. 
162  I am grateful to Professor Philip David for his explanation of this point.  
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 A statistical chance could be refined and personalized into a personal 
chance using specific factors which are embodied in the likelihood ratio. 
The probabilities in the likelihood ratio can be decomposed into factors in 
the light of specific case information in respect of patient history. Such 
factors could include the risk factors in Peterson,163 namely Peterson’s age 
(LR (Ag)), gender hypertension (LR (Gh)), hyperlipidaemia (LR (Hypl), 
obesity (LR (Ob)), left ventricular hypertrophy (LR (LVH)), and a history 
of smoking (LR (Hs)).164 The likelihood ratio is then found by obtaining 
the product of all the individual likelihood ratio factors. 
 Diagrammatically this can be expressed by: 
 
LR = LR (Ag) x LR (Gh) x LR(Hypl) x LR(Ob) x LR(LVH) x LR(Hs)  
(Caveat: components, i.e. Ag etc., must be statistically independent) 
 
 The use of all these factors is dependent on the specific case infor-
mation available. If all specific case information in respect of the factors is 
available, the posterior odds are calculated as follows: 
 
Posterior Odds = Prior Odds x LR = LR (Ag) x LR (Gh) x LR(Hypl) x 
LR(Ob) x LR(LVH) x LR(Hs) 
 
 Thus the posterior odds can be further refined by combining the prior 
odds, based on background information, with the likelihood ratios, based 
on case-specific information, to produce as accurate a posterior probability 
as possible.165 The nature of each risk factor likelihood ratio can represent 
a particularistic property of the individual claimant, provided they can be 
determined in the case in issue.166 There is therefore a need to obtain sta-
                                                   
163  Peterson, supra note 17. 
164  Ibid at para 120. 
165  See B Donatini, I Le Baye & P Krupp, “Causality Assessment of Spontaneous Report-
ing: Correlation Between Bayesian and Other Approaches” (1993) 7:4 Pharmaceutical 
Medicine 255 at 256. 
166  Personal Communication, Professor Philip David, Statistical Laboratory, Centre for 
Mathematical Sciences, Cambridge University, 12 July 2013; Robertson and Vignaux 
advocate that scientific evidence concerning an issue should be combined with other ev-
idence relating to the same issue, and that the most effective way of doing so is to ex-
press the evidence in likelihood ratio form for it to be subsequently combined with oth-
er evidence (Robertson & Vignaux, supra note 158 at 220). In addition, they have ob-
served that the likelihood ratio’s importance is that it determines relevance and proba-
tive value, the key determinants of admissibility of expert evidence (ibid at 22). Robert-
son and Vignaux have submitted that it is not essential to have precise numbers for 
each of the probabilities to assess the likelihood ratio (ibid). However, this would seem 
arguable in complex cases involving the establishment of causation with medicinal 
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tistics with an evidentiary foundation before such likelihood ratios can be 
calculated.167 
 This would seem to be a possible tool that can improve probabilistic 
precision in the Peterson–type case and in other cases involving medicinal 
products. In so doing, this tool can overcome the difficulties associated 
with the statistical chance/personal chance dichotomy.  
 It is clear that while Bayes’ theorem could provide a normative ap-
proach to legal decision making in the context of causation and medicinal 
products, implementing the theorem, in practice, is likely to be difficult.168 
We have seen that Bayes’ theorem assumes the presence of conditionally 
independent new evidence to update the previous evidence, but this new 
evidence is absent in many cases involving alleged adverse drug reac-
tions. This complicates the application of the theorem. The use of individ-
ual risk factor likelihood ratios in respect of individual items of evidence 
is potentially valuable, but these may be difficult to calculate in practice.  
It should also be conceded that if sample sizes are so small that one can-
not disaggregate data to provide information on individual risk factors, 
then the statistical refining process will fail. Moreover, while more de-
tailed individual ratios might improve the accuracy of the posterior odds, 
the introduction of too many additional quantities with imperfect estima-
tion could degrade it.169 However, the basic point here is not to suggest 
that Bayes’ theorem is necessarily the answer to the problem of establish-
ing specific causation in the context of epidemiological evidence. It is ra-
ther that logistic regression techniques and other forms of statistical re-
fining mechanisms using specific risk factors can and do help in the pro-
cess of giving quantitative or quasi-quantitative expression to conclusions 
about the cause of disease in an individual claim that is based on epide-
miological evidence. 
 Support for the refining and personalizing of epidemiological evidence 
in cases of individual causation involving medicinal products is now gain-
ing traction in courts. One relevant recent case is Andersen v. St Jude,170 
a Canadian trial on the merits of a class claim concerning the “safety of 
      
products (see Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law of Torts, supra note 2 at 43 n 
242). 
167  See Katherine Grevling, Book Review of Interpreting Scientific Evidence: Evaluating 
Forensic Science in the Courtroom by Bernard Robertson & GA Vignaux, (1996) 112 
LQR 509 at 510.  
168  Stephen E Fienberg & Mark J Schervish, “The Relevance of Bayesian Inference for the 
Presentation of Statistical Evidence and for Legal Decisionmaking” (1986) 66:4 BUL 
Rev 771 at 772, 782, 794. 
169  See also A Philip Dawid, “The Role of Scientific and Statistical Evidence in Assessing 
Causality” in Richard Goldberg, ed, Perspectives on Causation (Oxford: Hart, 2011) 133 
at 140–45. 
170  Andersen, supra note 18. 
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the mechanical prosthetic heart valves and annuloplasty rings with Sil-
zone that were designed and manufactured by the defendants and ap-
proved for sale in Canada in the late 1990s.” In Andersen, the Ontario 
Superior Court recognized that the doubling of risk standard is merely a 
presumptive threshold, so that a negative finding on causation could be 
rebutted using probative individualized evidence in a subsequent individ-
ual trial.171  
 Silzone was a proprietary term for a coating comprising layers of tita-
nium, pallodium, and an outer layer of metallic silver, which was applied 
to a polyester sewing cuff that surgeons used to attach a prosthetic heart 
valve to heart tissue. Silver is known as an antimicrobial, and the Silzone 
coating was designed to inhibit the growth of bacteria that could cause 
endocarditis, an infection of the lining of the heart that is a potential seri-
ous complication of heart valve surgery. Other than the application of the 
coating to the sewing cuff, “the Silzone valves were of the same design as 
conventional mechanical valves that the defendants had manufactured 
for many years.”172 Following a randomized clinical trial called AVERT, 
which had “revealed a small, but statistically significant increase in ex-
plants due to a medical complication known as paravalvular leak (PVL) in 
patients who had received a Silzone implant,” the defendants in Andersen 
issued a worldwide recall of all Silzone-coated products in early 2000.173 A 
class action against St. Jude Medical was commenced in 2001. At its core 
was a claim in negligence, which focused on the breach of St. Jude’s duty 
of care to patient class members and questions of general causation.174  
The plaintiffs advanced the theory that Silzone [was] a toxic sub-
stance that interfere[d] with the cells involved in tissue healing and 
impair[ed] the body’s ability to properly incorporate the Silzone de-
vice into the heart, thereby causing or contributing to a variety of 
serious medical complications for Silzone patients. As medical com-
plications can occur with all prosthetic heart valves, a key inquiry in 
this trial was whether Silzone ... materially increased [the] risk of 
[patients] experiencing one or more of these complications.175 
While the couching of this inquiry in terms of “material increase in risk” 
may seem peculiar,176 the issue being addressed was whether the plain-
                                                   
171  Ibid at para 1. 
172  Ibid at para 2. 
173  Ibid at para 1. 
174  Ibid at para 4. 
175  Ibid at para 5.  
176  The reason for the use of the word “material”, which was formulated by Justice Cullity 
in his certification decision (ibid at paras 5, 520), was “to ensure that findings with re-
spect to whether Silzone increases the risk of complications would be sufficiently mean-
ingful that they would be indicative of something more than a remote possibility of 
causation” (ibid at para 528). 
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tiffs could prove that the Silzone valve caused a true excess risk of the 
medical complications—above the risk caused by the conventional valves. 
In essence, the Ontario Superior Court was adopting the same approach 
to the issue as the English High Court in XYZ v. Schering Health Care 
Ltd.177  
 Notwithstanding that Justice Lax found that the defendants did not 
breach any duty of care in the pre-market design, manufacture, and test-
ing, or in the post-market surveillance, warning, and recall of Silzone-
coated products,178 she proceeded to determine the common issues of cau-
sation had the court found differently on the breach of duty issue. She ex-
plained that  
statistical epidemiological evidence ha[d] been presented to aid [her] 
in determining whether or not Silzone valve patients experience a 
higher risk of medical complications than conventional valve pa-
tients. In other words, the purpose of this evidence [was] to deter-
mine the risk of medical complications posed by the Silzone valve 
relative to the risk posed by the conventional valve.179  
This introduced the concept of relative risk, which was “a numerical ex-
pression of the risk of medical complications for one class of patients rela-
tive to another.”180 While recognizing the limitations of epidemiological 
evidence, in that it ought not to be considered determinative of individual 
causation,181 Justice Lax used simple arithmetic, the application of the 
“but for” test, and the balance of probabilities standard to conclude that 
for the purposes of issues of general causation in a class action trial, a 
doubling of risk standard should be adopted. A product (here the Silzone 
valve) thereby creates a material risk of an adverse event where the risk 
is at least twice the risk of the adverse effect occurring in the absence of 
the product’s use (namely, when using the conventional valve).182 
 However, in an important development which may help to constrain 
the emergence of overly optimistic emphasis on doubling of risk as some 
magic formula with which to prevent cases from going forward to trial in 
the future, Justice Lax explained that the establishment of material risk 
and the application of the doubling of risk standard were not determina-
tive of individual causation. Instead, for the purpose of individual class 
member claims, the application of the doubling of risk standard is merely 
                                                   
177  XYZ, supra note 40 at paras 20–21. 
178  See Andersen, supra note 18 at paras 6, 182–83, 214. 
179  See ibid at para 384. 
180  Ibid. 
181  See ibid at para 395. 
182  See ibid at paras 53238. The arithmetical explanation for adopting the “doubling of 
risk” rule (ibid at paras 53234) is almost identical to that provided in XYZ, supra note 
40 at para 21. 
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a presumptive as opposed to a prescriptive threshold, so that a negative 
finding on causation (where the relative risk is below two) could be rebut-
ted using probative individualized evidence in a subsequent individual 
trial.183 Justice Lax added that if she had found the defendants to be neg-
ligent, she would have presumptively applied the doubling of risk stand-
ard for materiality.184 Accordingly, patients who suffered complications for 
which the increase in risk was not material (i.e., where the relative risk 
was below two) or even not statistically significant would still be able to 
recover at the individual stage of those proceedings, provided they pre-
sented sufficient individualized evidence to rebut the presumption of a 
lack of causation flowing from a relative risk below two, and that they 
were able to persuade their trier of fact that Silzone was the “but for” 
cause of their complications.185 The benefit of adopting this approach is 
that “it does not shut the door on individual class members solely on the 
basis of evidence regarding group risk.”186 As Justice Lax explained, the 
adoption of a presumptive approach to materiality, permitting negative 
findings on causation to be rebutted by individualized evidence, allowed 
her to advance the litigation and to outline how a trier of fact at the indi-
vidual stage of similar proceedings could properly utilize relative risk as 
ascertained by epidemiological data.187  
Conclusion 
 We can make the following observations about recent cases from the 
United Kingdom that examine the role of epidemiological evidence in as-
sessing causation in medicinal product liability claims.  
 There remain considerable difficulties in reconciling standards of 
proof in law and in science. Despite the trenchant criticisms of the dou-
bling of risk theory in the United States, the theory appears to be gaining 
ground in the United Kingdom. However, the majority of the UK Supreme 
Court in Sienkiewicz appears to be sceptical of introducing a threshold for 
the use of epidemiological evidence and remain of the view that such evi-
dence can be useful but must be viewed with caution. Without further 
non-statistical evidence, there is reluctance for courts to proceed to find 
the existence of a causal relationship. The danger otherwise is that coun-
sel, in assessing the chances of success of “no win, no fee” multi-party 
product liability litigation, especially that which involves medicinal prod-
ucts, may regard this doubling of risk theory as the sole basis on which to 
                                                   
183  Andersen, supra note 18 at paras 542, 544, 555, 55859. 
184  “Materiality” means determining whether the Silzone valve materially increased the 
risk of a particular medical complication (ibid at para 427). 
185  Ibid at para 559. 
186  Ibid at para 560.  
187  Ibid at para 562. 
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allow or prevent cases from going forward to trial, even where epidemio-
logical evidence is lacking. This could potentially prejudice access to jus-
tice in future cases. If the doubling of risk approach is to be embraced by 
UK courts, it should be treated as it was in the Canadian decision of An-
dersen, where the standard operated as merely a presumptive as opposed 
to a prescriptive threshold, so that a negative finding on causation (where 
the relative risk is below two) could be rebutted using probative individu-
alized evidence in a subsequent individual trial. In such cases where 
there is a dearth of epidemiological evidence, courts and, for that matter, 
funding bodies should learn from the US experience and should avoid in-
sisting on epidemiological studies which have a relative risk of greater 
than two, allowing all evidence which falls “within a zone of reasonable 
[scientific] disagreement”188 to be considered.  
 While it seems the United Kingdom is becoming more receptive to the 
need for epidemiologists to come to court to speak to their evidence and 
for it to be taught to the fact finder, courts have nonetheless recently de-
veloped an overly cautious approach to the use of epidemiological evi-
dence, particularly in Scots law. We have seen two main reasons for judi-
cial scepticism about epidemiological evidence emerging from the case 
law, namely the propriety of drawing causal inferences from observed as-
sociations (a general causation issue) and the propriety of drawing causal 
inferences in individual cases from concededly causal associations ob-
served in samples of populations (a specific causation issue). The concern 
with taking such a cautious approach to epidemiological evidence is that 
it may make it harder to discern that there is any reconciliation of the le-
gal standard of proof on a balance of probabilities with the scientific 
standard of statistical significance. Moreover, there is also concern that 
placing an obligation on a plaintiff to teach epidemiological analysis to a 
court suggests that the court can remain passive in this process. This is 
surely an unhelpful approach in cases such as McTear, where there is a 
clear societal expectation that a judge will resolve these matters to the 
satisfaction of both parties. Had the pursuer explained the epidemiologi-
cal evidence properly, and had Lord Nimmo Smith been more receptive to 
evidence of relative risk, taken a more active role in forcing the pursuer to 
present her evidence effectively, and given adequate weight to the gener-
ally accepted scientific evidence that cigarette smoking can cause lung 
cancer, general causation could have been established in this case.  
 There also remains a lack of clarity on the extent to which generalized 
epidemiological evidence can be useful in determining individual, or spe-
cific, causation. Accordingly, this paper supports the use of logistic regres-
                                                   
188  Cranor, supra note 37 at 366; see also ibid at 289–90, 335. Courts should not exclude 
causal opinions based on non-epidemiological evidence where a body of epidemiological 
data does not exist (David L Faigman et al, “How Good is Good Enough?: Expert Evi-
dence Under Daubert and Kumho” (2000) 50:3 Case W Res L Rev 645 at 663).  
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sion techniques and other forms of statistical refining mechanisms using 
specific risk factors to give quantitative or quasi-quantitative expression 
to conclusions about the cause of disease in an individual drug product li-
ability claim that is based on epidemiological evidence. Logistic regression 
is also closely linked to other forms of statistical refining such as Bayes’ 
theorem. We have seen that while Bayes’ theorem can modify evaluations 
of probability based on initial assumptions in light of more data using 
specific factors embodied in the likelihood ratio, implementation of the 
theorem, in practice, is likely to be difficult. It is important to stress that 
Bayes’ theorem is not necessarily the answer to the problem of establish-
ing specific causation in the context of epidemiological evidence. However, 
the crucial point is that statistical refining mechanisms using specific risk 
factors can assist courts in determining specific causation in drug product 
liability cases when the dominating evidence is epidemiological in nature. 
This is likely to be increasingly true, as the quality of scientific evidence 
increases with time.189 
 It has been suggested that this approach could have been adopted 
with the specific case information available in Peterson, instead of the 
plaintiff ’s personal circumstances being blindly treated as diminishing 
the strength of the epidemiological evidence.190 Indeed, the interdiscipli-
nary Vaccine Safety Committee of the Institute of Medicine adopted such 
an “informal Bayesian approach” to assessing case reports in its review of 
scientific and medical literature on specific risks to children associated 
with vaccines.191 Courts could use this information to refine generalized 
statistics to produce as accurate a posterior probability as possible, espe-
cially in the pharmaceutical field. This, however, would require epidemi-
ologists and physicians to assist courts in such an exercise, and clearly, 
without courts having access to existing prior probabilities and the ability 
to quantify likelihood ratios, the utility of the process would be limited.192 
 Notwithstanding the scepticism of the majority of the UK Supreme 
Court in Sienkiewicz, there is little doubt that the use of epidemiological 
evidence in medicinal product liability cases, especially where non-
numerical solutions are elusive, has now come of age. Albeit with caution, 
                                                   
189  For support for a probabilistic model of specific causation in toxic torts, when the domi-
nating evidence comprises population-based data of the toxic effect, see especially Gold, 
“Certainty Dissolves”, supra note 130 at 281, 303–04, 338–39. 
190  Peterson, supra note 17. 
191  See Kathleen R Stratton, Cynthia J Howe & Richard B Johnston, Jr, eds, Adverse 
Events Associated with Childhood Vaccines: Evidence bearing on Causality (Washing-
ton, DC: Division of Health Promotion and Disease Prevention, Institute of Medicine, 
National Academy Press, 1994) at 25. 
192  See Cranor, supra note 37 at 256–59. For further discussion of the National Childhood 
Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, see Goldberg, Causation and Risk in the Law 
of Torts, supra note 2 at 163–70. 
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courts are recognizing the importance of such evidence. The challenge is 
now for lawyers and epidemiologists to come to some consensus as to 
what amounts to a suitable use of epidemiological evidence in such cases 
when establishing proof on a balance of probabilities. It is arguable that 
the so-called doubling of risk approach mooted in Sienkiewicz is overly 
simplistic. In particular, doubling of risk does not consider absolute risk 
(that is, the risk of something occurring without any context)193 and the 
severity of the outcome. Any attempt to reach a consensus in the future 
must address these, and related, difficult issues. 
     
                                                   
193  Feldschreiber, Mulcahy, and Day provide a good illustration of the failure to take ac-
count of absolute risk: “If there is an incidence of disease in an unexposed population of 
one in a million cases and in an exposed population of two in a million cases, the RR is 
two but the absolute risk is very low” (Feldschreiber, Mulcahy & Day, supra note 19 at 
188). The Federal Full Court of Australia observe in Peterson that “[d]oubling a very 
low absolute risk of an adverse result may produce an absolute risk which itself re-
mains so low that a positive finding of causation on the balance of probabilities would 
itself be an affront to common sense” (supra note 17 at para 119). However, I respectful-
ly submit that as a matter of statistics, this observation is incorrect. If one accepts the 
premise of this paper that population-based estimates are relevant to causal conclu-
sions in individual cases, then doubling of risk is doubling of risk, irrespective of abso-
lute risk. One can concede the intuitive appeal of the court’s statement. Thus, if in a 
population of 100 million unexposed individuals, only one case of disease were ex-
pected, who could submit that finding two cases represented anything other than a 
fluke? However, that intuition is merely an illustration of the difficulty in obtaining 
statistically significant results in the epidemiological investigation of rare conditions. If 
there were a way of designing an epidemiological study of sufficient quality, capable of 
identifying an association that truly exists (i.e., one with sufficient power), it could be 
said with great confidence that the exposure (generally) causes the disease. I am grate-
ful to an anonymous reviewer for this point. 
